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Introduction
For the past several decades, the Supreme Court has been an un-
relenting foe of invidious discrimination. The relevant question has
been not whether the Court would strike down invidiously discrimina-
tory practices, but which practices would be struck down as invidi-
ously discriminatory.
The Court's policy with respect to which statutes or policies are
invidious has changed over time. Regrettably, the Court has been
even more unpredictable than would have been expected. That un-
predictability can be attributed to a variety of factors: the changing
political orientation of the Court, the growing sophistication and sub-
tlety of would-be discriminators, the difficulty of proving subjective
intent, and the precariousness of making judgments based upon pre-
dictions of future consequences. All of these factors have received
some attention in court opinions and the secondary literature.1 What
have received comparatively little attention are the way that the
meaning of "invidious" itself has changed over time and the way that
Court decisions have recently manifested a pattern in which the Court
uses the word "invidious" in one sense in certain kinds of cases and in
a different sense in others. While each sense has an historical basis,
there is no basis for changing the meaning of the term when judging
relevantly similar cases. Further, there has been surprisingly little
analysis of when the Court is willing to presume antipathy,2 or of
when the presence of antipathy renders a policy unconstitutional.
This kind of patterned, subtle, unconscious alternation both of the
meanings of key terms and of the presumptions about the presence of
antipathy fosters the perception that the Court has lost its commit-
ment to rooting out invidious discrimination.
Recently, the Court has simultaneously made it more difficult to
(1) establish that discrimination against minorities is taking place and
(2) that affirmative action programs are not invidious. By doing this,
the Court allows some of the racial progress that has been made to be
lost, diminishes its own intellectual integrity, and promotes the view
that affirmative action policies, which seek to rectify past injustices,
are just as unacceptable as racist, sexist, and other discriminatory
practices. For theoretical and practical reasons, the Court's position
must change.
Part I of this article examines the definition of "invidious" as used
by the United States Supreme Court, paying special attention to the
1. See, e.g., Brown v. Board of Educ., 347 U.S. 483, 489 (1954) ("The most avid pro-
ponents of the post-War Amendments undoubtedly intended them to remove all legal dis-
tinctions among 'all persons born or naturalized in the United States.' Their opponents,
just as certainly, were antagonistic to both the letter and the spirit of the Amendments and
wished them to have the most limited effect. What others in Congress and the state legisla-
tures had in mind cannot be determined with any degree of certainty."); Charles R. Law-
rence I, The Id, the Ego, and Equal Protection: Reckoning with Unconscious Racism, 39
STAN. L. REv. 317, 319 (1987) ("Improper motives are easy to hide."); Kathleen M. Sulli-
van, City of Richmond v. J.A. Croson Co.: The Backlash Against Affirmative Action, 64
TuL. L. REv. 1609 (1990) ("A societal backlash has set in against affirmative action...
[which] has touched the Supreme Court.").
2. Antipathy may be defined as a hostile attitude towards a particular group or belief
in another group's inferiority. See 1 OxFoRD ENGLISH DICIONARY 529 (2d ed. 1989). See
also City of Cleburne v. Cleburne Living Center, 473 U.S. 432,440 (1985) (discussing laws
which "reflect prejudice and antipathy-a view that those in the burdened class are not as
worthy or deserving as others").
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assigned importance of an actor's intention and motivation. An ac-
tor's illicit motivation is neither a necessary nor a sufficient condition
to finding a practice "invidious." Thus, legislation passed out of ani-
mus is not per se unconstitutional and legislation created out of benev-
olence is not guaranteed to pass constitutional muster. Similarly, an
actor's illicit intention is neither a necessary nor a sufficient condition
to holding that a practice is "invidious." A legislature's intention to
discriminate will not make its legislation per se unconstitutional and a
legislature's lack of intention to discriminate will not guarantee that
legislation will be upheld.
The Court's "invidious" jurisprudence is confusing, in part, be-
cause the Court uses different criteria when judging the invidiousness
of statutes which (a) adversely affect suspect classes, rather than (b)
adversely affect fundamental interests. Yet, the Court's jurisprudence
is inconsistent even when limited to the former category. Sometimes,
the Court carefully distinguishes between the meanings of "intention"
and "motivation" and very carefully articulates why particular statutes
or policies are or are not constitutionally permissible. At other times,
the Court conflates the terms' meanings and offers conclusory analy-
ses of why particular policies or statutes pass or fail to pass constitu-
tional muster. Were the Court's inconsistency to occur randomly, it
would be regrettable but not pernicious. However, the Court's incon-
sistency manifests a disturbing pattern which leads one to infer that
the Court is reneging on its commitment to achieving racial integra-
tion and equality.
Part II explores the conditions under which affirmative action
policies in the education and employment contexts will be found in-
vidious. Different standards are used in these different contexts be-
cause the former involves the Equal Protection Clause,3 while the
latter involves the less strict standards of Title VII.4 Examining both
gives insight into the Court's changing view of invidiousness; in both
contexts, the Court has grown increasingly unwilling to impose bur-
dens on nonminorities and has become less sympathetic to minority
concerns.
Part III discusses the Supreme Court's implicit position on invidi-
ousness. The Court implies that all race-conscious programs, whether
benign or pernicious, are invidious and equally inappropriate. More
surprisingly, the Court imposes a stricter standard in affirmative action
cases than it does in cases involving the pernicious discrimination that
3. U.S. CONST. amend. XIV.
4. 42 U.S.C. § 2000e (1993).
has historically been practiced in this country. Unless the Court
changes its current standards of review, the Court will end up promot-
ing the effects which its invidious jurisprudence is designed to prevent.
I. Intention, Motivation, and Irrationality
A. Arbitrariness and Animus
The Court has not clearly articulated its criteria for invidiousness.
Sometimes, the Court implies that arbitrariness is a necessary and suf-
ficient condition for a statute's being invidious. At other times, the
Court implies that more is required, such as that the statute's passage
was motivated by animus.
The failure to articulate clear criteria may be due, at least in part,
to the historical development of the concept. At one point, there
seemed to be no need to clearly articulate the relevant standards;
whether they involved arbitrariness or animus, it was clear which stat-
utes were invidious. Invidious discrimination was relatively easy to
identify when, for example, it involved statutes which adversely af-
fected minorities because of an irrelevant characteristic such as race.5
It was quite clear from the Gomillion v. Lightfoot' that blacks were
having their votes diluted because of their race; it was similarly clear
in Loving v. Virginia7 that Virginia's antimiscegenation statute was
motivated by the belief that blacks were less worthy than whites.
The use of race as a criterion for who may vote or who may marry
whom is obviously irrational. Since all legislation must be rationally
supportable to pass constitutional muster under equal protection doc-
trine, it would seem relatively easy to strike down such statute. What
is less clear is whether those statutes were invidious because of their
irrationality or whether something in addition was required, for exam-
ple, an implicit claim that one race is inferior to another.8
5. See Kenneth L. Karst, Invidious Discrimination: Justice Douglas and the Return of
the "Natural-Law-Due-Process Formula", 16 UCLA L. REv. 716, 740 (1969) (noting that
the easy cases are those involving discrimination against a racial minority which are written
into laws and are obviously invidious and irrational).
6. 364 U.S. 339 (1960).
7. 388 U.S. 1, 7 (1967).
8. See Kent Greenawalt, Judicial Scrutiny of "Benign" Racial Preference in Law
School Admissions, 75 COLUM. L. REv. 559, 566 (1975) (purposes are called invidious be-
cause they impose a badge of inferiority and stigmatize); Hans A. Linde, Due Process of
Lawmaking, 55 NEB. L. REv. 197, 201 (1976) ("A law directed against members of... a
minority .... classifying them by who they are rather than what they do, create[s] an 'invid-
ious' or 'suspect' classification and w[ill] be subjected to 'strict scrutiny.'"); id. at 201-02
("Invidious prejudgment [is] grounded in notions of superiority and inferiority, in beliefs
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1. Invidiousness as Arbitrariness or Irrationality
Black's Law Dictionary defines "invidious" as "arbitrary, irra-
tional, and not reasonably related to a legitimate purpose."9 It is quite
tempting simply to say that discrimination is invidious if it is arbitrary
or irrational, and the Court has sometimes implicitly favored this
view. For example, in Levy v. Louisiana,10 the Court struck down a
law preventing illegitimate children from recovering for the wrongful
death of their mother. The Court concluded: "[I]t is invidious to dis-
criminate against [the children] when no action, conduct, or demeanor
of theirs is possibly relevant to the harm that was done the mother."'"
Insofar as a statute imposes burdens on individuals or classes for no
relevant reason, it is obviously constitutionally infirm.2 The Court
noted, "While a State has broad power when it comes to making clas-
sifications, it may not draw a line which constitutes an invidious dis-
crimination against a particular class. Though the test has been
variously stated, the end result is whether the line drawn is a rational
one."
13
It is unclear, however, whether statutes punishing illegitimates for
no relevant reason are unconstitutional because of their irrationality,
or for some other reason. Given the history of discrimination against
individuals born out of wedlock, it would be unsurprising if such a
statute had been passed out of antipathy. Thus, it is not clear whether
the statute in Levy was struck down because of its arbitrariness or
because it was motivated by animus.
2. Why Invidiousness Is More Than Mere Arbitrariness
Defining invidiousness solely in terms of arbitrariness and irra-
tionality is mistaken. Such a definition is both overinclusive and un-
derinclusive. It is overinclusive because some arbitrary and irrational
methods of classification do not seem invidious. 4 For example, sup-
about relative worth, attitudes that deny the premise of human equality and that will not
be readily sacrificed to mere facts.").
9. BLACK'S LAW DICrIONARY 826 (6th ed. 1990).
10. 391 U.S. 68 (1968).
11. Id. at 72 (footnotes omitted).
12. Karst, supra note 5, at 735 (words like "irrational" or "capricious" have come to be
used as shorthand for the conclusion that the state's classification is unconstitutional).
13. Levy, 391 U.S. at 71 (citations omitted).
14. Admittedly, whenever one attacks a definition, one must have some frame of ref-
erence, for example, common usage or a different definition. Invidiousness does not in-
volve arbitrariness alone, because it also involves feelings of ill will. See, e.g., WEBSTR'S
NEW UNIVERSAL UNABRIDGED DICrIONARY 966 (2d ed. 1983), where invidious is defined
as "likely to incur ill will or hatred, or to provoke envy; giving offense, especially by dis-
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pose that five people are to split a reward of one hundred dollars for
finding someone's lost pet. Each participated equally in the location
and recovery of the animal. One possibility would be to give each
person twenty dollars. Another would be for each person to roll a
pair of dice. The person with the lowest total would receive nothing
while the other four would each receive twenty five dollars. While the
latter method is arbitrary,15 it does not seem invidious.16 Each person
is equally likely to receive a reward and there is no apparent desire to
discriminate against any individual or group of individuals.
Defining invidiousness in terms of arbitrariness is underinclusive
because many statutes and practices which the current Court believes
are invidious promote legitimate purposes, such as rectifying some of
the effects of past discrimination.' 7 Were invidiousness solely limited
to utterly arbitrary statutes, many statutes currently held invidious
would be constitutionally permissible. 8
3. Invidiousness and the Rational Basis Test
A completely arbitrary statute will be held unconstitutional even
absent any evidence of animus. Such a statute could not pass the ra-
tional basis test.' 9 However, it is more difficult to establish the com-
plete arbitrariness of a statute than might be supposed. For example,
criminating unfairly; as, invidious comparisons," or 8 OxFoRD ENGLISH DICTIONARY 50
(2d ed. 1989), where invidious is defined as "[o]f an action, duty, topic, etc.: Entailing
odium or ill will upon the person performing, discharging, discussing, etc.; giving offence to
others." See infra text accompanying notes 96-160 for discussion of how the Court tries to
account for this visceral element.
15. In the case imagined, each person would be equally pleased to receive twenty dol-
lars-the net marginal utility of each dollar is roughly equal. In a different case in which
twenty five dollars met some kind of threshold, such that receiving twenty dollars was not
worth very much at all but receiving twenty five dollars was worth a great deal, the dice
method might be a rational way to divide up the reward.
16. Peter Brandon Bayer, Rationality-And the Irrational Underinclusiveness of the
Civil Rights Law, 45 WASH. & LEE L. Rnv. 1, 87 (1988) ("[G]ovemmental action violates
equal protection standards if the choice of classifications is so random that a coin flip
would serve as well to decide which classes would promote the governmental purposes or
ends."); Stuart W. Tisdale, Jr., Comment, Reasonable Accommodation and Non-Invidious
Discrimination Under the Maine Human Rights Act, 40 ME. L. REv. 475,487 (1988) (noting
that invidious might also describe antithesis of rational basis).
17. For example, in Wygant v. Jackson Bd. of Educ., 476 U.S. 267 (1986), the Court
struck down racial preferences in layoffs, denying that "societal discrimination alone is
sufficient to justify a racial classification." Id. at 274.
18. See Karst, supra note 5, at 735 (irrationality or arbitrariness in the old sense of
utter lack of justification is not required for a classification to be struck down).
19. For a discussion of the three-tiered test used by the Court to determine whether
statutes pass constitutional muster, see Mark Strasser, Suspect Classes and Suspect Classifi-
cations: On Discriminating, Unwittingly or Otherwise, 64 TEMP. L. Rnv. 937, 941-44 (1991).
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a statute is not arbitrary merely because it is not perfectly crafted and
a differently written statute would have better promoted the desired
end. The Court has been unwilling to demand extreme precision from
legislators, because such precision is not a "workable constitutional
requirement. ,20 Indeed, the Court may believe that a piece of legisla-
tion will have net harmful effects, yet hold the legislation constitution-
ally valid.'
More importantly, at least for the purposes of the current discus-
sion, the Court may not always uphold a statute even if it is a rational
means of promoting an arguably legitimate goal. The Court realizes
that states will sometimes claim to be promoting legitimate purposes
in an attempt to mask their illicit motivations. For example, in Mc-
Laughlin v. Florida,22 the state of Florida tried to justify a law punish-
ing interracial fornication more severely than intraracial fornication
by claiming that the statute was designed "to prevent breaches of the
basic concepts of sexual decency."'  The Court accepted the state's
characterization of the statute and the legitimacy of the state's goal of
preventing interracial marriage, but nonetheless struck down the law
as invidiously discriminatory because the "State's policy against inter-
racial marriage [could] be... adequately served by the general, neu-
tral, and existing ban on illicit behavior as by a provision... which
singles out the promiscuous interracial couple for special statutory
treatment."24
While the Court clearly reached the correct result, one would
have expected it to reach the opposite conclusion. If Justice Stewart is
correct that "the Equal Protection Clause is offended only by laws
that are invidiously discriminatory-only by classifications that are
wholly arbitrary or capricious,"' z and if Florida's distinction between
interracial and intraracial cohabitation was rational, given its antimis-
cegenation law (which was still constitutional at the time), Florida's
law would seem to have met the relevant test.
The Court held that the racial classification in the Florida statute
was "an invidious discrimination forbidden by the Equal Protection
20. Reynolds v. Sims, 377 U.S. 533, 577 (1964).
21. See Williamson v. Lee Optical of Oklahoma, Inc., 348 U.S. 483, 487 (1955) ("The
Oklahoma law may exact a needless, wasteful requirement in many cases. But it is for the
legislature, not the courts, to balance the advantages and disadvantages of the new
requirement.").
22. 379 U.S. 184 (1964).
23. Id. at 193.
24. Id. at 196.
25. San Antonio Indep. Sch. Dist. v. Rodriguez, 411 U.S. 1, 60 (1973) (Stewart, J.,
concurring).
Clause." 6 Had the Court been willing to hold that the goal (prohibit-
ing racial intermixing) was illegitimate, it could then have argued that
an invidious statute is one which (a) has an illegitimate end or (b) has
a legitimate end but uses an irrational means to promote that end.27
Perhaps the Court should be understood to have argued sub silentio in
McLaughlin that prohibitions of racial intermarriage were and are il-
legitimate. That way, the Court's use of invidious would not be partic-
ularly confusing.'
4. Invidiousness and the Animus Requirement
Before discussing "invidiousness" in the affirmative action con-
text,29 it might be helpful to demonstrate how "invidious" and
"noninvidious" are used in contexts which, at least facially, do not in-
volve race. In Jefferson v. Hackney,30 the Court reviewed a Texas pol-
icy detailing the allocation of government benefits. The Court held:
"So long as its judgments are rational, and not invidious, the legisla-
ture's efforts to tackle the problems of the poor and the needy are not
subject to a constitutional straitjacket. '31
When the Court talks about judgments which are "rational and
not invidious," it is not clear how the latter term is being used. "Invid-
ious" might be (a) a synonym for arbitrary or irrational, (b) a stand-in
for "racially discriminatory," where discrimination is measured solely
in terms of disparate racial impact, or (c) a stand-in for "racially dis-
criminatory," where discrimination is determined by looking at the
motivation and the intention behind the legislation.32 In allowing the
Texas system to stand, the Jefferson Court concluded that the legisla-
ture's decision to provide less welfare to some groups was not neces-
sarily "invidious or irrational. '33  Because it was clear that the
individuals who would suffer from the decreased benefits were dispro-
26. McLaughlin, 379 U.S. at 192-93.
27. See Bayer, supra note 16, at 86 ("[A] governmental entity acts irrationally when it
creates a classification which does not promote a legitimate goal or which pursues a goal
through illegitimate means.").
28. The Court struck down antimiscegenation statutes a few years after McLaughlin in
Loving v. Virginia, 388 U.S. 1 (1967).
29. Alternately labeled either "benign discrimination" or "invidious discrimination."
30. 406 U.S. 535 (1972).
31. Id at 546 (italics added).
32. See infra text accompanying notes 96-169 on motivation and intention.
33. Jefferson, 406 U.S. at 549 ("Applying the traditional standard of review .... we
cannot say that Texas' decision to provide somewhat lower welfare benefits for AFDC
recipients is invidious or irrational.").
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portionately either black or Hispanic3 4 the Court could not have been
using "invidious" merely to indicate disparate racial impact.35 While
the Court might simply have been using "invidious" as a synonym for
"arbitrary," it seems unlikely that the standard would simply be re-
dundant. The most plausible interpretation is that the Court did not
detect any animus and thus did not believe the statute invidious. 6
In New York City Transit Authority v. Beazer,37 the Court upheld
the Transit Authority's refusal to employ individuals who used metha-
done. While the Court acknowledged that the majority of the affected
individuals were black or Hispanic,38 it found no evidence of invidious
discrimination. 39 Here again, "invidious" cannot merely mean that
which has a disparate impact, and the most likely interpretation is that
the term requires some sort of animus.
In the cases cited,' the Court required an animus component
before holding the statute or policy invidious. The Court focused its
attention upon the motivation of the actor, among other factors. At
times, however, the Court has adopted a different tack, ignoring
whether animus was present and instead using "invidious" to indicate
that the statute under examination could not be justified in light of the
importance of the interest adversely affected.
5. The Invidiousness Scale for Statutes Adversely Affecting Interests
The Court uses a sliding scale when judging whether a statute
adversely affecting interests is invidious. The more important the in-
terest affected, the higher the standard that must be met for a statute
to avoid being classified as invidious. Consider two kinds of statutes:
34. See id. at 575 (Marshall, J., dissenting) ("The evidence... shows that 87% of the
AFDC recipients in Texas are either Negro or Mexican-American.").
35. For a discussion of disparate impact, see infra text accompanying notes 264-302.
36. See Jefferson, 406 U.S. at 575 (Marshall, J., dissenting) (suggesting that the Court
had made the wrong decision because the funding of AFDC at a lower level was in fact
motivated by animus towards African-Americans and Mexican-Americans).
37. 440 U.S. 568 (1979).
38. Id. at 579 ("The court, however, did not find that TA's policy was motivated by any
bias against blacks or Hispanics; indeed, it expressly found that the policy was not adopted
with a discriminatory purpose.").
39. In dissent, Justice White argued that an irrational and invidious distinction had
been made. He pointed out that many people suffer from some handicap related to em-
ployability, but only the respondents had been singled out for their alleged risk of unem-
ployability. "Such an arbitrary assignment of burdens among classes that are similarly
situated with respect to the proffered objectives is the type of invidious choice forbidden
by the Equal Protection Clause." Id. at 611 (1979) (White, J., dissenting) (footnote
omitted).
40. That is, McLaughlin, Jefferson, and Beazer.
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one which is completely arbitrary and the other which is (merely) ra-
tionally related to a legitimate state goal. In a case in which the classi-
fication is completely arbitrary, the classification cannot be justified
insofar as it adversely affects any interest and thus is invidious regard-
less of the importance of the interest affected. In a case in which the
classification is (merely) rationally related to a legitimate goal, the
statute will be upheld unless it adversely affects a fundamental inter-
est. For a statute adversely affecting a fundamental interest to avoid
being classified as invidious, it must promote a compelling state inter-
est.41 For example, in Shapiro v. Thompson,42 the Court held that a
"statutory prohibition of benefits to residents of less than a year cre-
ates a classification which constitutes an invidious discrimination de-
nying them equal protection of the laws,"'43 while nonetheless
recognizing that a state has a fundamental interest in preserving the
fiscal integrity of [its] programs.44
In Carrington v. Rash,45 the Court struck down a Texas constitu-
tional provision which prevented enlisted soldiers from establishing
residence, thereby preventing them from voting. The Court neither
claimed that the Texas provision was motivated by animus nor that it
was completely irrational-it was designed to prevent individuals who
did not have a stake in a community from determining its future.46
The Court merely claimed that Texas should allow individuals to es-
tablish their long-term intentions to remain in the state and, further,
should allow such individuals to vote. Here, the importance of the
right to vote justified the Court's striking a provision which was
(merely) rationally related to legitimate end.47
In Skinner v. Oklahoma,' the Court struck down a law which
allowed the state to impose a punishment of sterilization on a certain
41. See Karst, supra note 5, at 736 (noting that a classification that penalizes the exer-
cise of a basic constitutional right is an unconstitutional invidious discrimination unless
promoting a compelling government interest).
42. 394 U.S. 618 (1969). At issue in Shapiro was the fundamental right to travel.
43. Id. at 627.
44. Id. at 629.
45. 380 U.S. 89 (1965).
46. Many, but not all, servicepersons stationed in Texas would leave the state once
their term had ended. Their voting might reflect their short-term commitment and thus
might run counter to the long-term interests of their community.
47. For a discussion of how the importance of the right implicated affects the scrutiny
the Court will impose on a statute adversely affecting the exercise of that right, see
Strasser, supra note 19, at 942-44 (1991).
48. 316 U.S. 535 (1942).
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class of felon but not on another.49 The Court noted "Marriage and
procreation are fundamental to the very existence and survival of the
race," 50 and held that "[w]hen the law lays an unequal hand on those
who have committed intrinsically the same quality of offense and ster-
ilizes one and not the other, it has made as invidious a discrimination
as if it had selected a particular race or nationality for oppressive
treatment."51
The Skinner Court recognized that "a State is not constrained in
the exercise of its police power to ignore experience which marks a
class of offenders or a family of offenses for special treatment.52 In-
deed, the Court would have been wiling to give the state of Oklahoma
"that large deference" 53 which would normally have been appropriate
had the legislation not involved "one of the basic civil rights of
man."45 4 However, because sterilization was at issue, the Court de-
cided that "strict scrutiny ... [was] essential"5 5 and invalidated the
statute.
6. Invidiously Affecting Interests Versus Invidiously Affecting Groups
There is an important difference between statutes that are invidi-
ous because of how they affect fundamental rights and statutes that
are invidious because of how they affect protected groups. A statute
which adversely affects a fundamental right without promoting a com-
pelling state interest may be declared invidious even absent a showing
of animus.5 6 Such a showing is usually required, however, if a statute
is to be declared invidious because of its effect on a particular class.57
49. This is to be distinguished from castrating a sexual offender. While castration
seems cruel and inhuman in any case, the alleged justification for it would presumably be
that the offender would cease to perform these sexual offenses because of hormonal
changes. (It is an empirical question whether these offenses are prompted by hormonal
rather than, for example, psychological abnormalities.) Sterilization here is clearly aimed
at preventing the offender from having any (more) children and would seem to be no more
closely related to the prevention of felonies than would be any other severe penalty.
50. Skinner, 316 U.S. at 541.
51. Id. (emphasis added).
52. Id. at 540.
53. Id. at 541.
54. Id.
55. Id.
56. See, e.g., Skinner v. Oklahoma ex rel. Williamson, 316 U.S. 535 (1942) (because
procreation is a fundamental right, Oklahoma sterilization law was unconstitutional).
57. Statutes adversely affecting groups must have a discriminatory purpose to be
struck down as invidiously discriminatory. See Lawrence, supra note 1, at 318 (discussing
the "well-established doctrine [which] requires plaintiffs challenging the constitutionality
of a facially neutral law to prove a racially discriminatory purpose on the part of those
responsible for the law's enactment or administration"); see also infra note 85.
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There are at least two difficulties with the Court's not requiring a
showing of animus when finding statutes invidious because of their
effect on a fundamental right. First, it appears to make "invidious" a
conclusory term with no independent meaning of its own.5 8 "Invidi-
ous" should not merely be an empty term used as a rhetorical flourish.
Second, when the Court calls some legislation "invidious" and strikes
it down despite the absence of animus, but refuses to strike down other
legislation because of the absence of animus, the Court appears to act
capriciously. Lower courts cannot tell what role animus is to play in
determining a statute's invidiousness and hence in its constitutionality.
The Court's approach is "rudderless, affording no notice to interested
parties of the standards governing particular cases and giving no firm
guidance to judges who, as a consequence, must assess the constitu-
tionality of legislation before them on an ad hoe basis."5 9
The Court seems unaware that it uses "invidious" differently
when talking about statutes which adversely affect groups and those
which adversely affect fundamental rights. In Regents of the Univer-
sity of California v. Bakke,6" the plurality denied that "discreteness
and insularity constitute necessary conditions to a holding that a par-
ticular classification is invidious,"' 61 that is, the Court denied that
groups had to have the indicia of suspect status in order to be pro-
tected by the Fourteenth Amendment. For support, the plurality cited
Skinner and Carrington.62 Both of those cases, however, implicated
fundamental rights rather than protected groups. Because the Court
has required no showing of animus when finding statutes invidious
because of how they affect fundamental rights, and because Bakke did
not involve a fundamental right,63 the plurality's use of those cases
58. See Larry M. Lavinsky, DeFunis v. Odegaard: The "Non-Decision" with a Message,
75 COLUM. L. REv. 520, 526-27 (1975) (The terms "invidious" and "stigmatizing" "have
frequently been used by the Court in describing invalid classifications, but only in a con-
clusory manner, following a finding of racial classification unsupported by a compelling
state interest.").
59. Massachusetts Bd. of Retirement v. Murgia, 427 U.S. 307,321 (1976) (Marshall, J.,
dissenting).
60. 438 U.S. 265 (1978).
61. IL at 290 (denying that "discreteness and insularity constitute necessary precondi-
tions to a holding that a particular classification is invidious"). This should not be under-
stood to mean that the Court was trying to make the Fourteenth Amendment more robust
in its protection. See infra text accompanying notes 390-407.
62. Bakke, 438 U.S. at 290 (citing Skinner v. Oklahoma, 316 U.S. 535, 541 (1942) and
Carrington v. Rash, 380 U.S. 89, 94-97 (1965)).
63. Primary and secondary education do not implicate fundamental interests. See San
Antonio Indep. Sch. Dist. v. Rodriguez, 411 U.S. 1 (1973). A fortiori, a university educa-
tion does not implicate such a right.
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was a non sequitur. The plurality instead should have cited cases
which involved statutes or policies adversely affecting groups and
which were declared invidious despite the absence of animus.64
Occasionally, the Court has found statutes invidious when they
adversely affect groups (rather than fundamental rights) even when
they do not evidence any animus. For example, in Craig v. Boren,65
the Court examined an Oklahoma law which made the drinking age
for females eighteen and for males twenty-one. The Court concluded
that "the relationship between gender and traffic safety [was] far too
tenuous to satisfy [the] requirement that the gender-based difference
be substantially related to achievement of the statutory objective. 66
Because the statute did not pass the relevant test, the Court held that
the "statute invidiously discriminate[d] against males 18-20 years of
age." 67 The majority did not, however, claim that the statute imposed
a stigma on males or that the legislature had been motivated by some
sort of animus toward males.68
7. The Promotion of (Unrealistic) Stereotypes Is Invidious
The rationale underlying the Boren decision involved an aversion
to the existence and perpetuation of certain stereotypes about males
and females, such as that women, but not men, do not or should not
drink.69 Indeed, the Court feared that the statistics presented con-
cerning drunk driving arrests were skewed because of existing stereo-
types. "The very social stereotypes that find reflection in age-
differential laws, are likely substantially to distort the accuracy of
these comparative statistics. Hence reckless young men who drink
and drive are transformed into arrest statistics, whereas their female
counterparts are chivalrously escorted home. 70
The Court does not believe that all laws which differentiate on
the basis of sex invariably reinforce impermissible stereotypes. When
a law distinguishes between males and females in a way that passes
64. The Court might have cited Craig v. Boren, 429 U.S. 190 (1976). For a discussion
of that case, see infra text accompanying notes 65-68.
65. 429 U.S. 190 (1976).
66. Id. at 204.
67. Id.
68. Only one Justice claimed that there had been a history of discrimination against
males. See id. at 212 (Stevens, J., concurring) (The Oklahoma law "is a mere remnant of
the now almost universally rejected tradition of discriminating against males in this age
bracket.").
69. See infra text accompanying notes 186-204 (discussing the reinforcement of
stereotypes).
70. Boren, 429 U.S. at 202 n.14 (citation omitted).
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constitutional muster, the Court does not describe the statute as invid-
ious. In Michael M. v. Superior Court,7 ' the Court said that it would
uphold "statutes where the gender classification is not invidious, but
rather realistically reflects the fact that the sexes are not similarly situ-
ated in certain circumstances."'72 The Court implied that a statute will
not be deemed invidious as long as it realistically reflects dissimilari-
ties73 that are not merely trivial.74
If the Court really believed that statutes are not invidious as long
as they reflect realistic, non-trivial differences, it would uphold virtu-
ally all statutes reflecting such differences. The Court makes quite
clear, however, that the Equal Protection Clause requires no such re-
suit. For example, "if statistics were to govern the permissibility of
state alcohol regulation without regard to the Equal Protection Clause
as a limiting principle, it might follow that States could freely favor
Jews and Italian Catholics at the expense of all other Americans."'75
After all, "available studies regularly demonstrate that the former two
groups exhibit the lowest rates of problem drinking." 76 So, too, even
if unassailable statistics were to show that women had a much lower
rate of problem drinking than men, the Court presumably would not
uphold drinking laws which favored the former at the expense of the
latter.
8. Invidiousness and Race
The Court seems to be most wary of classifications based on race,
probably because it believes that the central purpose of the Four-
teenth Amendment is to eliminate all official, race-based, invidious
71. 450 U.S. 464 (1981).
72. Id at 469.
73. But see Los Angeles Dept. of Water & Power v. Manhart, 435 U.S. 702 (1978)
(holding that real differences in longevity between men and women do not justify differ-
ences in benefit programs). But see infra text accompanying notes 196-203 for a discussion
of the benefit programs in General Electric Co. v. Gilbert, 429 U.S. 125 (1976), and
Geduldig v. Aiello, 417 U.S. 484 (1974).
74. The Court wrote:
We need not be medical doctors to discern that young men and young women are
not similarly situated with respect to the problems and the risks of sexual inter-
course. Only women may become pregnant, and they suffer disproportionately
the profound physical, emotional, and psychological consequences of sexual activ-
ity. The statute at issue here protects women from sexual intercourse at an age
when those consequences are particularly severe.
Michael M., 450 U.S. at 471-72.
75. Craig v. Boren, 429 U.S. 190, 208 n.22 (1976).
76. Id
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discrimination.7 If statutes involving racial discrimination "are ever
to be upheld, they must be shown to be necessary to the accomplish-
ment of some permissible state objective, independent of the racial
discrimination which it was the object of the Fourteenth Amendment
to eliminate."7 8 Yet, the Fourteenth Amendment did not preclude
race-conscious measures designed to help blacks. During the period
in which the Fourteenth Amendment was passed, Congress estab-
lished Freedmen's Bureaus "to help blacks adapt to the white man's
society and economy. 79
Recently the Court has indicated that it may not uphold a racial
classification, even if that classification is necessary to the accomplish-
ment of permissible state objectives and even if that classification is
independent of the racial discrimination against minorities which it
was the object of the Fourteenth Amendment to eliminate." Indeed,
the current Court seems to have adopted a position similar to the one
articulated by Justice Stewart in dissent in Fullilove v. Klutznick.81
"[R]acial discrimination is by definition invidious discrimination. '
Justice Stewart implies that racial discrimination is invidious regard-
less of actual motivation.
The Court's invidiousness jurisprudence is schizophrenic in that
the Court changes its definition of invidious depending on the kind of
case it is considering. In one kind of case, invidiousness involves arbi-
trariness and irrationality. 3 Invidious statutes may be utterly arbi-
trary and thus not meet the rational basis test, or they may adversely
affect fundamental interests without promoting compelling state inter-
ests. When statutes are invidious in this sense, there need be no show-
ing of malice. In the other kind of case, however, motivation is quite
important. A statute which is nonarbitrary and does not adversely
77. Loving v. Virginia, 388 U.S. 1, 10 (1967). The Court in Loving argued that the
"clear and central purpose of the Fourteenth Amendment was to eliminate all official state
sources of invidious racial discrimination in the States." Id.
78. Id. at 11.
79. LAWRENCE M. FRIEDMAN, A HISTORY OF AMERICAN LAW 505 (2d ed. 1985).
80. See City of Richmond v. J.A. Croson Co., 488 U.S. 469 (1989) (plurality opinion).
81. 448 U.S. 448 (1980).
82. Id. at 526 (Stewart, J., dissenting). But see Louis Henkin, De Funis: An Introduc-
tion, 75 COLUM. L. REv. 483, 486 (1975) ("Racial classifications which, upon scrutiny,
prove to be 'neutral,' having no invidious purpose or consequence, are not objectionable
per se.") (emphasis added).
83. See supra notes 9-13 and accompanying text.
84. See supra notes 41-56 and accompanying text.
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affect a fundamental interest may nonetheless be held unconstitu-
tional if there is a showing of illicit motivation. 5
Although the Court's definition of invidious is confusing because
the word seems to change meaning depending upon the kind of case,
that confusion could be cleared up relatively easily. The Court could
simply stop using "invidious" when discussing "arbitrary" cases and
fundamental rights cases, and could then require a showing of animus
whenever finding a statute or policy invidious. Alternatively, the
Court could make clear that "invidious" means different things in dif-
ferent contexts.
B. The Importance of the Presence or Absence of Antipathy
While the difficulties posed by the Court's ambiguous use of "in-
vidious" are not particularly formidable, the Court's presumptions
about when antipathy is present pose additional difficulties. On the
one hand, absent some reason to infer antipathy, the Court believes
that it should not presume that such sentiments are motivating the
statute or practice under examination."'
Even intentional discrimination may not provide reason to infer
antipathy. For example, in United Jewish Organizations of Williams-
burg, Inc. v. Carey,17 the Court upheld a voting redistricting plan de-
spite the explicit consideration of race and despite the foreseen
adverse effects on a racial group. "There is no doubt that.., the State
deliberately used race in a purposeful manner. But its plan repre-
sented no racial slur or stigma with respect to whites or any other
race, and we discern no discrimination violative of the Fourteenth
Amendment... "88
The absence of intent to make a slur or impose a stigma is often
cited by the Court when it upholds legislation or policies which affect
different races differently. The Court upheld the New York Transit
Authority employment policy in New York City Transit Authority v.
Beazer,8 9 because it was "neither unprincipled nor invidious in the
85. Joseph Thssman & Jacobus ten Broek, The Equal Protection of the Laws, 37 CAL.
L. REv. 341, 355 (1949) ("The argument does not deny that the classification in question
may be reasonably related to a legitimate public purpose, but asserts that even if it is so
related it is invalid.").
86. Vance v. Bradley, 440 U.S. 93, 97 (1979) ("The Constitution presumes that, absent
some reason to infer antipathy, even improvident decisions will eventually be rectified by
the democratic process and that judicial intervention is generally unwarranted no matter
how unwisely we may think a political branch has acted.") (footnote omitted).
87. 430 U.S. 144 (1977).
88. 1& at 165.
89. 440 U.S. 568 (1979).
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sense that it implie[d] disrespect for the excluded subclass."90 In Fulli-
love, where the Court upheld a provision entitling minority-owned
businesses to favorable treatment, the Court pointed out that there
was no showing that "Congress has inadvertently effected an invidious
discrimination by excluding from coverage an identifiable minority
group that has been the victim of a degree of disadvantage and dis-
crimination equal to or greater than that suffered by the groups en-
compassed by the.., program." 91
On the other hand, when there is evidence of antipathy, the
Court will typically strike down the legislation or policy.92 The impor-
tant issue becomes what counts as evidence of antipathy. The Court
could demand direct evidence of illicit motivation before finding ani-
mus. This predicate would be very difficult to establish93 because indi-
viduals or legislators who wished to invidiously discriminate would be
unlikely to reveal their actual motivations. Thus, the Court would up-
hold much invidiously discriminatory legislation if it required direct
evidence of malice. Realizing this, the Court is sometimes willing to
infer antipathy.94
While the Court's willingness to infer antipathy is commendable,
the Court's position poses certain risks. If, for example, the Court
requires that illicit motivation be demonstrated in cases involving dis-
crimination against minorities (making it more difficult to establish
that invidious discrimination is occurring) but is willing to infer illicit
motivation in cases involving affirmative action, the Court may per-
petuate exactly the kinds of practices it claims to want to eliminate.95
90. Id. at 592.
91. Fullilove v. Klutznick, 448 U.S. 448, 486 (1980).
92. See, e.g., Palmore v. Sidoti 466 U.S. 429 (1984); Loving v. Virginia, 388 U.S. 1
(1967).
93. See Lawrence, supra note 1, at 319 ("[A] motive-centered doctrine of racial dis-
crimination places a very heavy, and often impossible, burden of persuasion on the wrong
side of the dispute. Improper motives are easy to hide.") (footnote omitted); Robert Nel-
son, Note, To Infer or Not to Infer a Discriminatory Purpose: Rethinking Equal Protection
Doctrine, 61 N.Y.U. L. Rav. 334, 336 (1986) ("The standard essentially only protects
against actions by officials who are either stupid or honest enough to express their racist,
sexist, or otherwise unconstitutional purposes.").
94. International Bd. of Teamsters v. United States, 431 U.S. 324, 335 n.15 (1977)
("Proof of discriminatory motive is critical, although it can in some situations be inferred
from the mere fact of differences in treatment.").
95. See infra text accompanying notes 316-36 (discussing when the Court infers illicit
motivation and when it demands that it be demonstrated).
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1. The Distinction Between Motivations and Intentions
Before one can understand how illicit motivation can make an
otherwise constitutionally permissible statute unconstitutional, one
must make some distinctions which are implicit within the Court's de-
cisions. Motivations and intentions are different things. While both
are psychological constructs,96 they perform different functions.
A person's motivation is what prompts him or her to behave in a
particular way; for example, one might be motivated by love or ha-
tred. Intention, or purpose, involves an aim or goal-it involves what
one does or wants rather than why one did it.9' Black's Law Diction-
ary states:
In common usage intent and "motive" are not infrequently re-
garded as one and the same thing. In law there is a distinction
between them. "Motive" is said to be the moving course, the
impulse, the desire that induces criminal action on part of the
accused; it is distinguished from "intent" which is the purpose or
design with which the act is done, the purpose to make the
means effective.98
This distinction is easily illustrated.
Suppose that Jones purposefully kills Smith. His intention is to
bring about Smith's death. His motivation is not yet clear-it may be
animus (Smith may be of the wrong race, religion, or sexual orienta-
tion) or it may be benevolence (Smith may be suffering horribly and
Jones might want to put him out of his misery). Let us say that K1 is
Jones's killing Smith out of animus and that K2 is Jones's killing Smith
out of compassion. K and K2 are identical in terms of what was in-
tended (bringing about the death of Smith), what was done (giving a
lethal injection), and what consequences followed (the death of
Smith), even though the motivations were vastly different.
96. See Owen M. Fiss, A Theory of Fair Employment Laws, 38 U. CH. L. REv. 235,
297 (1971) ("The central causal concepts of the antidiscrimination prohibition, such as
'based on,' 'because of,' and 'on the grounds of,' are given a psychological gloss. They are
thought to refer to the employer's state of mind.").
97. For a discussion of how the difference between intention and motivation can play
an important role in moral evaluation, see Mark Strasser, Hutcheson and Mill on Evaluat-
ing Actions and Characters, 22 PHLoSOPHiA (forthcoming, 1992-93).
98. BLAcK's LAw DICTIONARY 1014 (6th ed. 1990). The failure to distinguish between
the meanings of motive in the law and in common usage may cause courts to confuse the
relevant issues. For example, the Supreme Court of Ohio cites WEnBSTER's Nnr NEW
COLLEGIATE DICTIONARY (1984) to support its equating a motive with a reason for acting.
See State v. Wygant, 597 N.E.2d 450, 453 & n.6 (1992).
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This distinction is easily misunderstood. One's motivation is not
simply one's reason for acting 99-one's reason for acting may be indis-
tinguishable from one's intention. 00 In the above example, Jones's
reason for giving the lethal injection was to kill Smith. His intention,
or purpose, was to kill Smith. These were identical, although neither
is equivalent to his motivation, which might have been either compas-
sion or hatred.
2. The Court's Conflation of Intention and Motivation
Unfortunately, the Court has helped obscure the difference be-
tween intention and motivation. For example, in General Building
Contractors Association, Inc. v. Pennsylvania,10 1 the Court concluded
that Title 42 U.S.C. section 1981, "like the Equal Protection Clause,
can be violated only by purposeful discrimination."'" Yet the Court
explicated purposeful discrimination in terms of an "invidiously dis-
criminatory animus behind the conspirators' action."'" 3 Indeed, for
most of the history of discrimination law, the question has not been
whether the intentional discrimination was motivated by malice, but
whether the discrimination was in fact intentional."°
The Court has sometimes made use of this implicit relation (if
intentionally discriminatory, then motivated by animus) to establish
99. Commentators sometimes make this claim. See, e.g., Paul J. Gudel, Beyond Cau-
sation: The Interpretation of Action and the Mixed Motives Problem in Employment Dis-
crimination Law,, 70 TEx. L. REv. 17, 77 (1991) ("[M]otives are a kind of reason for
acting.").
In Williamson v. Mitchell, 113 S. Ct. 2194 (1993), the Court noted Mitchell's argument
that "the Wisconsin penalty-enhancement statute is invalid because it punishes the defend-
ant's discriminatory motive, or reason, for acting." Id. at 2200. The Court did not point
out that motive and intention had been conflated but instead argued that "motive plays the
same role under the Wisconsin statute as it does under federal and state antidiscrimination
laws, which we have previously upheld against constitutional challenge." Id.
100. Commentators do not seem to appreciate this. See, e.g., Gudel, supra note 99, at
76 ("An explanation of an action in terms of a motive is an explanation in terms of some
further end that the actor wants to attain.").
101. 458 U.S. 375 (1982).
102. Id. at 391. But see id. at 408 (Marshall, J., dissenting) (arguing that § 1981 focuses
on the effects of discrimination on the protected class, and not on the intent of the person
engaging in the discriminatory conduct).
103. Id. at 390 n.17 (quoting Griffin v. Breckenbridge, 403 U.S. 88, 102 (1971)).
104. See Paul Brest, Palmer v. Thompson: An Approach to the Problem of Unconstitu-
tional Legislative Motive, 1971 Sup. CT. Rv. 95, 109 (1971) ("[It is highly probable that a
racial classification reflects prejudice on the decisionmaker's part."). However, this may
no longer be true. See Roy L. Brooks, The Affirmative Action Issue: Law, Policy and Mo-
rality, 22 CoNm. L. REv. 323, 353 (1990) ("Traditional discrimination against minorities and
females is motivated by an invidious discriminatory animus; discrimination through affirm-
ative action programs is not.").
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that a particular policy was not intentionally discriminatory. The
Court has held that the absence of animus precludes the possibility
that the discrimination was intentional. For example, in Beazer, the
Court held that the "District Court's express finding that the rule was
not motivated by racial animus forecloses any claim in rebuttal that it
was merely a pretext for intentional discrimination,"'" 5 implying that
there could be no intentional discrimination without animus.1 06
When the current Court finds a statute or policy intentionally ra-
cially discriminatory, it will find that policy or statute invidious-it
will refuse to find that the statute or policy was motivated by benevo-
lence, evidence to that effect notwithstanding. In explaining why it
was skeptical of programs employing purportedly benign racial classi-
fications, the Croson plurality wrote, "Absent searching judicial in-
quiry into the justification for such race-based measures, there is
simply no way of determining what classifications are 'benign' or 're-
medial' and what classifications are in fact motivated by illegitimate
notions of racial inferiority .... ."107
3. The Court's Reluctance to Find Benevolent Discrimination
While it is clear that the current Court will refuse to find inten-
tionally racially discriminatory statutes benevolently motivated, it is
less clear why this is so. The Croson plurality's rationale is not partic-
ularly clear. Its concern might be to discover the motivation (what
motivated passage of the measure), the intention (whether it was
designed to be benign or remedial), or some of the background beliefs
held by the policy-maker (false notions of racial inferiority). These
factors should not be conflated. A policy-maker might hold "illegiti-
mate notions of racial inferiority" as background beliefs, yet be moti-
vated by benevolence to create a program intended to compensate for
this perceived inferiority. A different policy-maker might hold those
same beliefs and be motivated by malice to create a program intended
to exploit this perceived inferiority.
One possible explanation for the Court's reluctance to find stat-
utes benevolently motivated is that the Court lacks confidence in its
own ability to distinguish between invidious and noninvidious statutes
105. New York City Transit Auth. v. Beazer, 440 U.S. 568, 587 (1979).
106. Basically, the Court is arguing: if x (intentional discrimination), then y (motivated
by animus); if -y (no animus), then -x (no intentional discrimination). While the argument
is valid (the conclusion follows from the premises), it is not clear that it is sound (i.e., that
the argument is valid and the premises are true). Justice White, for example, casts doubts
on the truth of the premises. See supra text accompanying note 39.
107. Croson, 488 U.S. at 493.
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or policies. The Court has at least three worries. First, the Court is
concerned about its ability to detect animus.'0 8 Second, the Court is
concerned about its ability to infer the true intention behind legisla-
tion and refuses to take claims of good intention at face value.10 9 As
Justice Brennan pointed out, "a purportedly preferential race assign-
ment may in fact disguise a policy that perpetuates disadvantageous
treatment of the plan's supposed beneficiaries. Accordingly courts
might face considerable difficulty in ascertaining whether a given race
classification truly furthers benign rather than illicit objectives."'10
Third, the Court is concerned about its ability to predict the net ef-
fects of legislation. A preferential race assignment might in fact per-
petuate disadvantageous treatment, for example, because of
unforeseeable complicating factors. As the First Circuit Court of Ap-
peals pointed out, "Once racial classifications are imbedded in the
law, their purpose may become perverted: a benign preference under
certain conditions may shade into a malignant preference at other
times.""' That a piece of legislation was motivated out of benevo-
lence does not guarantee that it will have no ill effects, especially if
one considers the precedential value of the legislation." 2 Sometimes,
however, the Court is quite confident of its ability to differentiate be-
tween benevolent and malicious legislation with respect to the motiva-
tion behind it, its purpose, and the effects that will result from it."13
108. Palmer v. Thompson, 403 U.S. 217, 224 (1971) ("[lt is extremely difficult for a
court to ascertain the motivation, or collection of different motivations, that lie behind a
legislative enactment.").
109. Weinberger v. Wiesenfeld, 420 U.S. 636, 648 (1975) ("[Tlhe mere recitation of a
benign, compensatory purpose is not an automatic shield which protects against any in-
quiry into the actual purposes underlying a statutory scheme.") (footnote omitted);
Croson, 488 U.S. at 500 ("The mere recitation of a 'benign' or legitimate purpose for a
racial classification is entitled to little or no weight.").
110. United Jewish Org. of Wifiamsburgh, Inc. v. Carey, 430 U.S. 144, 172-73 (1977)
(Brennan, J., concurring in part) (citation omitted). See also Wygant v. Jackson Bd. of
Educ., 476 U.S. 267, 310 (1986) (Marshall, J., dissenting) ("The concerns that have
prompted some Members of this Court to call for narrowly tailored, perhaps court-or-
dered, means of achieving racial balance spring from a legitimate fear that racial distinc-
tions will again be used as a means to persecute individuals, while couched in benign
phraseology.").
111. Associated Gen. Contractors of Mass. v. Altshuler, 490 F.2d 9, 17 (1st Cir. 1973).
112. United Steelworkers of America, AFL-CIO-CLC v. Weber, 443 U.S. 193, 219
(1979) (Burger, C.J., dissenting) ("There is always the danger that the seeds of precedent
sown by good men for the best of motives will yield a rich harvest of unprincipled acts of
others . . ").
113. Metro Broadcasting v. F.C.C., 497 U.S. 547,565 n. 12 (1990) (Court was "confident
that 'an examination of the legislative scheme and its history' [would] separate benign
measures from other types of racial classifications.") (citing Weinberger, 420 U.S. at 648
n.16).
4. Making All Racial Classifications Pernicious by Fiat
It is one thing for the Court to claim that it cannot confidently
distinguish between benign and invidious discrimination. It is quite
another to suggest that all racial discrimination is pernicious and
should be prohibited. In his dissent in Fullilove, Justice Stewart made
clear his belief that the Equal Protection Clause prohibits all racial
discrimination." 4 In her dissent in Metro Broadcasting, Justice
O'Connor argued, " "Benign' racial classification' is a contradiction in
terms,"" 5 and "[d]ivorced from any remedial purpose and otherwise
undefined, 'benign' means only what shifting fashions and changing
politics deem acceptable.""n6
The Court will examine almost all racial classifications with strict
scrutiny.117 But in equating the kind of scrutiny appropriate for be-
nevolent and malicious discrimination, the Court sends the wrong
message to society. In his Croson dissent, Justice Marshall argued that
by imposing the same standard of review on "remedial classifications"
as on "the most brutal and repugnant forms of state-sponsored ra-
cism," the Court sends a signal that "it regards racial discrimination as
largely a phenomenon of the past, and that government bodies need
no longer preoccupy themselves with rectifying racial injustice.""' 8
This is an especially offensive signal because the majority does not
need protection from the minority. As the Court in Hunter v. Erick-
son 119 pointed out, "The majority needs no protection from discrimi-
114. Fullilove, 448 U.S. at 524 (Stewart, J., dissenting) ("[O]ur cases have made clear
that the Constitution is wholly neutral in forbidding... racial discrimination, whatever the
race ... [of] its victims.") (citations omitted).
115. Metro Broadcasting, 497 U.S. at 609 (O'Connor, J., dissenting).
116. Id. at 615.
117. See Fullilove, 448 U.S. at 491 ("Any preference based on racial or ethnic criteria
must necessarily receive a most searching examination to make sure that it does not con-
flict with constitutional guarantees."). Id. at 537 (Stevens, J., dissenting) ("Racial classifi-
cations are simply too pernicious to permit any but the most exact connection between
justification and classification."). See also Croson, 488 U.S. at 520 (Scalia, J., concurring)
("[S]trict scrutiny must be applied to all governmental classification by race, whether or
not its asserted purpose is 'remedial' or 'benign."'); Metro Broadcasting 497 U.S. at 609
(O'Connor, J., dissenting) (strict scrutiny is the appropriate standard for racial classifica-
tions); Wygant, 476 U.S. at 273 ("[Tlhe level of scrutiny does not change merely because
the challenged classification operates against a group that historically has not been subject
to governmental discrimination."). But see Wygant, 476 U.S. at 301-02 (Marshall, J., dis-
senting) (noting that when remedying vestiges of past discrimination, a less exacting stan-
dard of review is appropriate).
118. Croson, 488 U.S. at 552 (Marshall, J., dissenting).
119. 393 U.S. 385 (1969).
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nation and if it did, a referendum might be bothersome but no more
than that.1120
5. Making the Imposition of Strict Scrutiny Nonfatall'2
Even if strict scrutiny is imposed, this does not imply that all race-
conscious statutes or policies must be struck down. Insofar as strict
scrutiny is imposed to determine whether animus motivates a particu-
lar piece of legislation, a variety of statutes and policies would seem
constitutionally permissible, such as affirmative action policies to as-
sure that role models are present as teachers in schools. 122 Because
assuring the presence of role models in no way stigmatizes those who
do not get the jobs, this rationale would seem to be a noninvidious
justification for intentional discrimination. The Court, however, has
rejected this rationale because it "has no logical stopping point."''1
The Court fears that the role model theory "could be used to 'justify'
race-based decisionmaking essentially limitless in scope and
duration." 24
The most obvious rationale for affirmative action has been articu-
lated by Justice Marshall. "[R]acial classifications drawn for the pur-
pose of remedying the effects of discrimination that itself was race
based have a highly pertinent basis: the tragic and indelible fact that
discrimination against blacks and other racial minorities in this Nation
has pervaded our Nation's history and continues to scar our soci-
ety."' The Court, however, believes that "societal discrimination,
without more, is too amorphous a basis for imposing a racially classi-
fied remedy.'1 26
In Wygant, the Court insisted "upon some showing of prior dis-
crimination by the governmental unit involved before allowing limited
use of racial classifications in order to remedy such discrimination."' 27
Justice Stewart argued that there is only one kind of case in which an
120. Id. at 391.
121. See Gerald Gunther, The Supreme Court, 1971 Term-Foreworc" In Search of
Evolving Doctrine on a Changing Court: A Model for a Newer Equal Protection, 86 HARv.
L. REv. 1, 8 (1972) (strict scrutiny is "strict in theory and fatal in fact"). There is no reason
that strict scrutiny must be fatal.
122. Cf. Wygant, 476 U.S. at 316-17 (Stevens, J., dissenting) (arguing that inclusion of
minority teachers tends to dispel the illusion that there are significant differences between
the races).
123. Id. at 275.
124. Croson, 488 U.S. at 498.
125. Id. at 552 (Marshall, J., dissenting).
126. Wygant, 476 U.S. at 276.
127. Id.
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affirmative action policy is permissible-"where its sole purpose is to
eradicate the actual effects of illegal race discrimination."'"
When the Court refuses to accept past societal discrimination as a
valid justification for affirmative action, it is not denying the existence
of past discrimination.12 9 Nor, presumably, is it claiming that charges
of past discrimination somehow stigmatize the descendants of those
discriminators. 30 Rather, the Court seems to fear that upholding the
validity of such a justification would lead to "too much" affirmative
action. The Court seems to fear that "[in the absence of particular-
ized findings, [other courts] could uphold remedies that are ageless in
their reach into the past, and timeless in their ability to affect the
future.''
Perhaps such a fear would be warranted in a country very differ-
ent from ours, in which the justification would be used as a rationale
for pervasive race-conscious programs which caused minorities to be
"overrepresented." That scenario is not credible in this country at this
time.1
32
6. Invidiously Motivated Versus Noninvidiously Motivated
Discrimination
In its intentional discrimination jurisprudence, the Court blurs
the difference between two kinds of discrimination. One involves in-
vidiously motivated policies or statutes, which the Court rightly re-
fuses to uphold. The other involves noninvidiously motivated,
intentionally discriminatory legislation. There seems to be little con-
troversy about whether intentional discrimination which harms minor-
ities and is motivated by animus should be struck down. It is a
different and far more difficult question whether intentional discrimi-
nation which does not harm minorities and is not motivated by animus
should also be struck down.
Regrettably, the Court has not been particularly consistent in ex-
plaining why the latter is usually constitutionally offensive. Some-
times the Justices simply presume that intentional discrimination is
128. Fullilove, 448 U.S. at 528 (Stewart, J., dissenting).
129. See infra text accompanying notes 325-26.
130. But see infra text accompanying note 177.
131. Id. See also infra text accompanying notes 220-21.
132. See Bureau of the Census, U.S. Dep't of Commerce, Statistical Abstracts of the
United States 395 (113th edition 1993) (Table 625) (comparing unemployment rates of
blacks and whites). It should be clear that blacks are not "overrepresented" in the work
force.
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motivated by animus.1 33 At other times the Court admits that such
discrimination can be motivated by benevolence but is too worried
about the potential risks of making racial distinctions. In Fullilove,
the Court expressed its misgivings about benevolent discrimination.
"The history of governmental tolerance of practices using racial or
ethnic criteria for the purpose or with the effect of imposing an invidi-
ous discrimination must alert us to the deleterious effects of even be-
nign racial or ethnic classifications when they stray from narrow
remedial justifications."'1 34 In her dissent in Metro Broadcasting, Jus-
tice O'Connor explained her resistance to racial classifications. "The
dangers of such classifications are clear. They endorse race-based rea-
soning and the conception of a Nation divided into racial blocs, thus
contributing to an escalation of racial hostility and conflict."' 35 But
the effect of prohibiting remedial race-conscious measures is uncer-
tain. It is at least as likely, if not more likely, that the Court's refusal
to allow race-conscious affirmative action policies will increase rather
than decrease racial division and animosity. It would seem that the
most direct method of rectifying past injustice would be by allowing
reverse discrimination.
The Court disfavors race-conscious measures because it believes
them intentionally discriminatory in a pejorative sense. When decid-
ing which policies or statutes are in fact intentionally discriminatory,
the Court must make a decision analogous to the one it must make
when deciding which policies or statutes are adopted out of an invidi-
ous motivation. Just as the Court could require a demonstration of
invidious motivation, or, instead, infer it from the circumstances, the
Court could require direct evidence of intentional discrimination, 36
or, instead, infer discriminatory intent from the circumstances. There
are dangers, however, in adopting either approach. Adopting the for-
mer may lead to numerous instances of discrimination not being
found discriminatory because no smoking gun was found, while adopt-
ing the latter may lead to numerous instances being found discrimina-
tory that arguably were not.' 37
133. See e.g., Loving v. Virginia, 388 U.S. 1, 7 (1967) (concluding that Virginia's antimis-
cegenation law was not only intentionally discriminatory, but was "obviously an endorse-
ment of White Supremacy."
134. Fullilove, 448 U.S. at 486-87.
135. Metro Broadcasting, 497 U.S. at 603 (O'Connor, J., dissenting).
136. See, e.g., Pullman-Standard v. Swint, 456 U.S. 273, 289-90 (1982) ("Discriminatory
intent here means actual motive; it is not a legal presumption to be drawn from a factual
showing of something less than actual motive.").
137. See Alan Freeman, Antidiscrimination Law: The View from 1989, 64 TuL- L. Rnv.
1407, 1443 (1990) (suggesting that Croson was wrongly decided).
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7. Which Kinds of Intent Are Actually Invidious?
The Court is divided about what kinds of intent are actually in-
vidious. Sometimes the Court will refuse to strike down an intention-
ally discriminatory statute or policy unless some antipathy to the
disadvantaged class is established.'3 8 In Southeastern Community Col-
lege v. Davis, 39 the Court justified its holding that a nursing program
had not been guilty of invidious discrimination against the handi-
capped. "The uncontroverted testimony.., established that the pur-
pose of its program was to train persons who could serve the nursing
profession in all customary ways. This type of purpose, far from re-
flecting any animus against handicapped individuals, is shared by
many if not most [similar] institutions.' 140 Because of its finding that
no animus was involved, the Court concluded that the policy was not
invidious. The Court has articulated the same position in other
cases.1
41
The Court has made clear that its equal protection cases have
recognized a distinction between
"invidious discrimination"-i.e., classifications drawn "with an
evil eye and an unequal hand" or motivated by "a feeling of
antipathy" against a specific group of residents, and those spe-
cial rules that "are often necessary for general benefits [such as]
supplying water, preventing fires, lighting districts, cleaning
streets, opening parks, and many other objects."'142
8. The Role of Invidiousness
Even if classifications are drawn "with an evil eye and an unequal
hand," this will not end the matter. Suppose, for example, that it can
be established that a legislature, motivated by malice, passed inten-
tionally discriminatory legislation. There is still the further question
of how much of a role that motivation played in the passage of the bill.
Such a bill might have passed even if no animus had been present. An
138. T"ssman & ten Broek, supra note 85 at 358 ("Laws are invalidated by the Court as
discriminatory because they are expressions of hostility or antagonism to certain groups of
individuals."). See also Robert W. Bennett, Reflections on the Role of Motivation Under
the Equal Protection Clause, 79 Nw. U. L. REv. 1009, 1009 (1984) (illegitimate motivation
required if seeking to strike invidiously discriminatory action).
139. 442 U.S. 397 (1979).
140. Id. at 413 (citation omitted).
141. See, e.g., United Jewish Org. of Williamsburg, Inc. v. Carey, 430 U.S. 144 (1977).
142. New York City Transit Auth. v. Beazer, 440 U.S. 568, 593 n.40 (1979) (citations
omitted).
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illicitly motivated law might nonetheless be a good law.' 43 Further, if
such a statute were declared unconstitutional solely because there had
been evidence of animus, the legislature could simply pass a very simi-
lar statute, this time making sure that no such evidence existed. 44
While the Court would know that the previous bill had been passed
out of animus, the Court might nonetheless feel constrained to uphold
the law if indeed it was a permissible law and if indeed there was no
showing of animus this time. In Arlington Heights v. Metropolitan
Housing Development Corporation,45 the Court upheld the lower
court's determination that racial animus had not been established.
The Court commented:
Proof that the decision by the Village was motivated in part by a
racially discriminatory purpose would not necessarily have re-
quired invalidation of the challenged decision. Such proof
would, however, have shifted to the Village the burden of estab-
lishing that the same decision would have resulted even had the
impermissible purpose not been considered. 4 6
The Court imposes this but-for condition because it believes that
legislation struck down because of the motivation behind it would
have to be upheld were it repassed without a showing of illicit
motivation.
[T]here is an element of futility in a judicial attempt to in-
validate a law because of the bad motives of its supporters. If
the law is struck down for this reason, rather than because of its
facial content or effect, it would presumably be valid as soon as
the legislature or relevant governing body repassed it for differ-
ent reasons.' 47
143. Tussman & ten Broek, supra note 85 at 360 ("it is altogether possible for a law
which is the expression of a forbidden motive to be a good law"). See also John Hart Ely,
Legislative and Administrative Motivation in Constitutional Law, 79 YALE LJ. 1205, 1274
(1970) ("The considerations which support a reference to unconstitutional motivation in
discretionary choice situations suggest that when an unconstitutionally motivated choice
can be thus defended in terms of a legitimately defensible difference, motivation should
not be considered."); Larry G. Simon, Racially Prejudiced Governmental Actions: A Moti-
vation Theory of the Constitutional Ban Against Racial Discrimination, 15 SAN Dmo L.
Rnv. 1041, 1064-65 (1978) (An overt rule effected by prejudice should be upheld if a court
is entirely confident that the same rule would have been enacted even apart from preju-
dice."); Contra Brest, supra note 104 at 119 ("It should suffice to demonstrate that illicit
motivation played a non-trivial part in the decisionmaking process, so it might have af-
fected the outcome.").
144. See Ely, supra note 143, at 1214 (arguing that there is little point in demanding
correct motivation if legislature can reenact the statute by stressing the "right" factors).
145. 429 U.S. 252 (1977).
146. Id. at 271 n.21.
147. Palmer, 403 U.S. at 225. See also Michael M., 450 U.S. at 472 n.7 ("The question
for us-and the only question under the Federal Constitution-is whether the legislation
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The Court appears to be very clear about what the Fourteenth
Amendment prohibits. "[P]roof of discriminatory racial purpose is...
necessary in making out an equal protection violation."'14  Yet, the
Court is quite unclear about when discriminatory intention may be
inferred. The Bakke plurality wants everyone to understand that the
"guarantee of equal protection cannot mean one thing when applied
to one individual and something else when applied to a person of a
different color. If both are not accorded the same protection, then it
is not equal."'149 By the same token, in Orr v. Orr50 the Court refused
to consider which sex was being disadvantaged by the statute under
consideration. "The fact that the classification expressly discriminates
against men rather than women does not protect it from scrutiny."''
Yet, the UJO Court did not apply a race-blind test and the Michael M,
Court did not apply a sex-blind test.
When spelling out what unequal treatment and intentional dis-
crimination involve, the Bakke plurality suggested, "Racial and ethnic
distinctions of any sort are inherently suspect and thus call for the
most exacting judicial examination." '152 While the Court clearly ac-
cepts "the general equal protection principle that the 'invidious qual-
ity' of governmental action claimed to be racially discriminatory 'must
ultimately be traced to a racially discriminatory purpose," 53 the cur-
rent Court seems to find any racially discriminatory purpose offensive,
that is, it does not seem to care about the motivation of the actor.
The Bakke plurality offered a justification for this position by
pointing out that
the white "majority" itself is composed of various minority
groups, most of which can lay claim to a history of prior discrim-
ination at the hands of the State and private individuals. Not all
of these groups can receive preferential treatment and corre-
sponding judicial tolerance of distinctions drawn in terms of race
and nationality, for then the only "majority" left would be a new
minority of white Anglo-Saxon Protestants. There is no princi-
violates the Equal Protection Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment, not whether its sup-
porters may have endorsed it for reasons no longer generally accepted.") (citation
omitted).
148. Washington v. Davis, 426 U.S. 229, 244-45 (1976).
149. Bakke, 438 U.S. at 298-90.
150, 440 U.S. 268 (1979).
151. IM at 279.
152. Bakke, 438 U.S. at 291.
153. Batson v. Kentucky, 476 U.S. 79, 93 (1986) (citing Washington v. Davis, 426 U.S.
229, 240 (1976)).
W'rmter 19941
352 HASTINGS CONSTITUTIONAL LAW QUARTERLY [Vol. 21:323
pled basis for deciding which groups would merit "heightened
judicial solicitude" and which would not.'54
If in fact there is no principled way to decide which groups deserve
special judicial solicitude and which do not, the Court's suspect class
jurisprudence is itself rendered questionable. 55 Interestingly, the
Bakke plurality did not seem worried about the extension of this anal-
ysis to gender issues, pointing out that "the perception of racial classi-
fications as inherently odious stems from a lengthy and tragic history
that gender-based classifications do not share. "156
Rather than cast doubt on the Court's whole strict scrutiny juris-
prudence, the plurality might have argued that all racial classifications
will receive strict scrutiny andthat all gender-based classifications will
receive heightened scrutiny.' 57 That way, the basic structure of the
Court's strict scrutiny standard would be supported rather than under-
mined. Instead, the Bakke plurality merely suggested that "gender-
based distinctions are less likely to create the analytical and practical
problems present in preferential programs premised on racial or eth-
nic criteria. With respect to gender there are only two possible classi-
fications."' 58 Yet it is not particularly more difficult to find out
whether an individual fits into one of several categories (for example,
American Indian or Alaskan Native, Filipino, Origins in Indian sub-
continent, Hispanic, Black, Asian, Pacific Islander, White) than one of
two categories.159
154. Bakke, 438 U.S. at 295-96.
155. For an analysis suggesting that the Court's suspect class jurisprudence is questiona-
ble even if one brackets the Court's confusing position on affirmative action, see Strasser,
supra note 19, at 937.
156. Bakke, 438 U.S. at 303.
157. See Craig v. Boren, 429 U.S. 190, 197 (1976) ("[Cllassifications by gender must
serve important governmental objectives and must be substantially related to achievement
of those objectives.")
In many instances; a program will be designed to benefit both women and racial mi-
norities. The reviewing court might subject the entire program to strict scrutiny. See Cone
v. Hillsborough County, 908 F.2d 908, 912-13 (11th Cir. 1990) or Conlin v. Blanchard, 890
F.2d 811, 816 (6th Cir. 1989). Or it might divide the program into two parts, employing
strict scrutiny when reviewing the part involving racial classifications and heightened scru-
tiny when reviewing the part involving the gender classification. See Coral Construction v.
King County, 941 F.2d 910, 930-32 (9th Cir. 1991).
Some commentators suggest that affirmative action programs involving gender classi-
fications should be subjected to strict scrutiny. See John Galotto, Note, Strict Scrutiny for
Gender, Via Croson, 93 COLUM. L. REv. 508 (1993). Yet, employing strict scrutiny for
affirmative action programs benefiting women but only heightened scrutiny for policies
adversely affecting women is grossly unfair.
158. Bakke, 438 U.S. at 302-03.
159. The question would not be whether a person could fit into more than one category,
but rather whether the person would fit into at least one category.
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When the Court expresses its misgivings about affirmative action,
it is not merely pointing out that some individuals will have benefits or
burdens that others will not; this happens whenever classifications are
made. "[lit is axiomatic that the consequence of regulating by setting
apart a classified group is that those in it will be subject to some re-
strictions or receive certain advantages that do not apply to other
groups or to all the public."'160 Nonetheless, the dangers which the
Court sees and the prophylactic measures which it is willing to take
seem greater in the affirmative action context. Further, in its invidious
discrimination jurisprudence, the Court conflates a number of factors
which must be kept separate if it is to offer a coherent analysis capable
of providing consistent guidance to lower courts and public and pri-
vate actors. As suggested above, the Court conflates motivation and
intention. It also conflates different senses of intention, sometimes
concentrating on the actor's specific goal and sometimes concentrat-
ing on the possible effects of the statute or policy regardless of the
actor's goal.
C. Intentions, Effects, and Perceptions
The Court weighs a variety of considerations when deciding
whether a particular policy or statute is invidious. Sometimes, it con-
siders the legislature's intention construed narrowly, and at other
times more broadly. A very narrow sense of "intention" includes only
the legislature's aims or goals. In Personnel Administrator of Massa-
chusetts v. Feeney, the Court denied that a statute which differentiated
among groups on its face was necessarily discriminatory or invidious.
"'Discriminatory purpose' ... implies more than intent as volition or
intent as awareness of consequences. It implies that the deci-
siomaker... selected or reaffirmed a particular course of action at
least in part 'because of,' not merely 'in spite of,' its adverse effects
upon an identifiable group."'' The effects must be desired in order
to be intended. Foreseen but undesired consequences are not inten-
tional by this account.
A somewhat broader (although still fairly narrow) sense of inten-
tion includes both the legislature's goals and the foreseen conse-
quences of its actions. A still broader sense of intention includes
those consequences which were not only intended but reasonably
160. Kotch v. Board of River Port Pilot Comm'rs, 330 U.S. 552, 556 (1947).
161. Personnel Adm'r of Mass. v. Feeney, 442 U.S. 256, 279 (1979) (citation and foot-
note omitted).
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foreseeable. 62 At least in part because the Court is sometimes con-
cerned with a very narrow sense, sometimes with a slightly broader
sense, and sometimes with a very broad sense of intention, its rulings
have been confusing and confused. 163
Not only does the Court seem confused about what sense of in-
tention it should use, it also seems confused about how heavily it
should weigh particular factors when determining whether a statute or
practice involves invidious discrimination. For example, it seems clear
that "classifications drawn 'with an evil eye and an unequal hand' or
motivated by 'a feeling of antipathy' against a specific group" offend
the Constitution.164 Yet the Court does not believe that the presence
of antipathy alone will justify striking down a statute as invidiously
discriminatory. 65 An illicit motivation coupled with actual or prob-
able negative effects may invalidate legislation. Thus, when there is
evidence of malice and the target group is suffering, a statute or policy
may be struck down as invidious. 66 Unfortunately, the Court will not
always strike down a statute or policy even when there is proof of
malice, discriminatory intent, and harm to a protected group. In
Palmer v. Thompson,167 the Court refused to prevent the city of Jack-
son from closing down its swimming pools rather than integrating
them. The Court noted first that "neither the Fourteenth Amendment
nor any Act of Congress purports to impose an affirmative duty on a
State to begin to operate or to continue to operate swimming
pools."' 68 The Court held that the presence of animus did not, with-
out more, justify enjoining the pool closings, arguing that "no case in
this Court has held that a legislative act may violate equal protection
solely because of the motivations of the men who voted for it.' 69 In
162. See MARK STRASSER, AGENCY, FREE WILL, AND MORAL REsPONsmmrY 47-50
(1992) (discussing some of the different senses of intention).
163. Cf. Mark S. Brodin, The Role of Fault and Motive in Defining Discrimination: The
Seniority Question Under Title VII, 62 N.C. L. REv. 943, 978 (1984) (arguing that the no-
tion of intent as purpose represents a rejection of the traditional tort view of intent in
which the term generally is defined without regard to purpose, and merely distinguishes
conduct that is deliberate from conduct that is accidental). Unfortunately, the Court is less
consistent in the invidious discrimination context than Brodin implies.
164. Beazer, 440 U.S. at 593 nA0 (citations omitted).
165. See Palmer v. Thompson, 403 U.S. 217, 224 (1971).
166. See JOHN HART ELY, DEMOCRACY AND DismRusT (1980) 136-37.
167. 403 U.S. 217 (1971).
168. Id. at 220.
169. Id. at 224. See also Michael M., 450 U.S. at 472 n.7 (1981) ("The question for us-
and the only question under the Federal Constitution-is whether the legislation violates
the Equal Protection Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment, not whether its supporters
may have endorsed it for reasons no longer generally accepted.").
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one of its more embarrassing decisions, the Court concluded that
there was no violation, despite evidence of both animus and harm.
1. Negative Effects and the But-For Requirement
The Court will not strike down a piece of legislation merely be-
cause it was intended to harm a group not deserving that harm. Ac-
tual harm must have occurred or be likely to occur. Thus the Court
imposes (at least) two conditions: actual (or probable) harm, and in-
tent to harm.
When seeking to discover an actor's intentions, one can ask the
actor, hoping that she will have enough insight to know her own inten-
tions and enough honesty to reveal them. One can infer what her
intentions were, given her actions and the surrounding circumstances.
If one infers the actor's intention, the actor may deny the accuracy of
the inference, for example, claiming that she had no intention of dis-
criminating against anyone. While one may not believe her, one
should be very careful before discounting her claims about her own
intentions.170
A different question is whether the agent foresaw the conse-
quences of her action, even if she did intend the results. If she fore-
saw that a particular practice would have very negative consequences
and, without desiring those consequences, nevertheless acted in a way
which she knew would bring them about, one can infer that she was at
least willing to countenance those consequences, as long as she could
bring about the intended results as well. It is precisely because the
foreseen consequences of our actions enter into our calculations about
whether to bring about our intended results that intended and fore-
seen consequences are sometimes reasonably grouped together when
discussing intentions. 1 ' While it would be inaccurate to say that the
agent intended to bring about the foreseen consequences in and of
themselves, it is accurate to say that she intended to bring about the
170. But see Paul J. Gudel, Beyond Causation: The Interpretation of Action and the
Mixed Motive Problem in Employment Discrimination Law, 70 TEx. L. REv. 17, 87 (1991)
("Human actions are complex; the world is complex. But what is striking is the extent to
which we can and do feel confident enough about the intentions of others that even their
own disavowals do not shake our impressions."). Yet, what is striking about this may be
that it evidences our own hubris rather than our ability to detect others' intentions. Cf.
Gerald C. MacCallum Jr., Legislative Intent, 75 YALE LJ. 754, 760 (1966) (noting that
because "the legislator may simply have misjudged the effectiveness of the statutory
scheme," it is a mistake "to interpret the words of the statute so that the statute will be an
effective instrument for the achievement of the [purported] purpose").
171. For an extended discussion of this point, see MARK STRASSER, AGEN y, Flnn
WILL AND MoRAL RF_sPONsmILrrY 206-210 (1992).
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foreseen consequences given that she could bring about the intended
consequences as well. The Court seemed to capture this point in
United States v. O'Brien when it suggested that "the inevitable effect
of a statute on its face may render it unconstitutional."' 72 The Court
concluded that "the purpose [that is, the intention in the narrowest
sense of that word] of the legislation was irrelevant, because the inevi-
table effect ... abridged constitutional rights.' 73
One consequence (whether intended or foreseen) which will not
be countenanced by the Court is the imposition of stigma on a particu-
lar race. In Loving, the Court invalidated Virginia's antimiscegena-
tion law because it imposed a stigma on blacks.' 74 The Court has also
taken into account which group is adversely affected by a statute's
distribution of benefits and burdens. For example, the United Jewish
Organization Court upheld an intentionally discriminatory redistrict-
ing plan because it did not impose a racial stigma or slur on the disad-
vantaged class.' 75
Commentators have recognized the Court's tendency to look at
whether the disadvantaged class is stigmatized, and have pointed out
that affirmative action policies do not impose a stigma on whites.176
This point has not convinced the Court. Indeed, Justice Stevens sug-
gests that affirmative action policies may "stigmatize[ ] the disadvan-
172. 391 U.S. 367, 384 (1968). See also Ira Michael Heyman, The Chief Justice, Racial
Segregation, and The Friendly Critics, 49 CAL. L. REv. 104,119 (1961) (The Court has more
difficulty in determining when an illicit classification has been used "when the statute uses
a nonracial classification and the classification seems to support a generally accepted pol-
icy, but in fact casts disadvantages much more heavily on Negroes than on others."); D.
Don Welch, Removing Discriminatory Barriers: Basing Disparate Treatment Analysis on
Motive Rather than Intent, 60 S. CAL. L. REv. 733, 773 (1987) ("Since purposefully discrim-
inatory conduct is no longer generally acceptable in our society, it is often disguised
through the use of rules or procedures which have some plausible relation to legitimate
concerns."); id. at 776 ("Times have changed. The main problem now is not blatant, mali-
cious acts, but the perpetuation of unknowing categorization and stereotyping which is just
as effective (perhaps more effective) in denying people the opportunity to realize their
humanity.").
173. O'Brien, 391 U.S. at 385 (citation omitted).
174. Loving v. Virginia, 388 U.S. 1, 7 (1967). See also Brown v. Bd. of Educ., 347 U.S.
483, 494 (1954); Strauder v. West Virginia, 100 U.S. 303, 308 (1879).
175. United Jewish Org. of Williamsburgh, Inc. v. Carey, 430 U.S. 144, 165 (1977).
176. See Paul Brest, The Supreme Court 1975 Term Forward: In Defense of the Antidis-
crimination Principle, 90 HARv. L. Rnv. 1, 17 (1976) (Commenting that in affirmative ac-
tion cases, it is unlikely that stigmatic injury will accompany deprivation); Arval A. Morris,
Equal Protection, Affirmative Action and Racial Preferences in Law Admissions: De Funis
v. Odegaard, 49 WASH. L. REv. 1, 36 (1973) (noting that preferential admissions policies
are not a covert attempt to stigmatize the majority white race as inferior, and hence are not
invidious.)
taged class with the unproven charge of past racial discrimination.' 177
Justice Kennedy acknowledges that racial preferences need not stig-
matize. Arguably, in the affirmative action context, "the group disad-
vantaged by the preference should feel no stigma at all, because racial
preferences address not the evil of intentional discrimination but the
continuing unconscious use of stereotypes that disadvantage minority
groups.' 178 Nevertheless, Justice Kennedy rejected this argument be-
cause "this is not a proposition that the many citizens, who to their
knowledge 'have never discriminated against anyone on the basis of
race,' will find easy to accept.' 1 79 Insofar as the issue is unconscious
racism, however, it would be unsurprising for individuals to fail to re-
alize that they hold racially prejudiced views.'8 0
Currently, the Court will seek to determine whether the statute
or policy stigmatizes either the advantaged or the disadvantaged class.
It fears that affirmative action policies may impose a stigma on
blacks.1 81 Indeed, the plurality in Bakke worried that "preferential
programs may only reinforce common stereotypes holding that certain
groups are unable to achieve success without special protection based
on a factor having no relationship to individual worth.' 18 2
2. The Importance of How Policies Are Perceived
Many members of the Court worry about how affirmative action
policies will be perceived. It is very dangerous to base decisions on
possible perceptions, however, if only because they might not occur.
Further, notwithstanding the plurality's fears in Bakke, people might
actually believe that affirmative action programs exist because minori-
ties require protection from lingering racist tendencies.
Perhaps the most serious difficulty with basing Supreme Court
decisions on possible perceptions is that people are likely to be di-
177. Croson, 488 U.S. at 516-17 (1989) (Stevens, J., concurring in part and concurring in
the judgment); see also Paul N. Cox, The Supreme Cour4 Title VII and "Voluntary" Affirm-
ative Action-A Critique, 21 IND. L. Rnv. 767,775 (1987) ("[Tlhe argument fails to account
for the attitude of the disfavored majority person toward the remedial motivation.... If
the majority person accepts the remediation rationale, he is likely to regard himself as
morally inferior.").
178. Metro Broadcasting, 497 U.S. at 636 (Kennedy, J., dissenting).
179. Id.
180. Cf. Lawrence, supra note 1, at 321 ("[The illness of racism infects almost every-
one."); id. at 322 ("[M]ost of us are unaware of our racism.").
181. See Brest, supra note 176, at 21 ("A court or other decisionmaker confronted with
an apparently benign race-dependent practice should [determine]... whether it seems to
reflect assumptions of racial inferiority or selective indifference and whether it seems likely
to inflict stigmatic injury or add to cumulative harms.").
182. Bakke, 438 U.S. at 298.
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vided no matter what the Court does. While it is likely that some will
view the Court's upholding of affirmative action policies as granting a
special preference to less qualified individuals, it is also likely that
some will view the Court's striking down of such policies as evidence
that the Court itself is racist. Being guided by the possible reactions
to its decisions will guarantee that the Court will act wrongly no mat-
ter what decision it finally renders.
In City of Richmond v. l.A. Croson Co.,183 the plurality argued,
"Classifications based on race carry a danger of stigmatic harm. Un-
less they are strictly reserved for remedial settings, they may in fact
promote notions of racial inferiority and lead to a politics of racial
hostility."' 84 The Court seems not to appreciate the possible effects of
refusing to eradicate racist practices and of implying that racism and
discrimination are no longer pervasive problems. If minorities are sig-
nificantly underrepresented in the workplace and the Court implies
that this cannot be attributed to discrimination, the Court itself may
be reinforcing "common stereotypes holding that certain groups are
unable to achieve success without special protection based on a factor
having no relationship to individual worth."' 85
3. The Invidiousness of Promoting Outmoded Ways of Thinking
The Court will strike down statutes which promote outmoded
ways of thinking about specific groups, 86 for example, "stereotypes
about the 'proper place' of women and their need for special protec-
tion."187 Yet when striking down such statutes, the Court must evalu-
183. 488 U.S. 469 (1989) (plurality opinion).
184. Id. at 493; see also Metro Broadcasting, 497 U.S. at 604 (O'Connor dissenting).
Justice O'Connor worries that "[r]acial classifications, whether providing benefits to or
burdening particular racial or ethnic groups, may stigmatize those groups singled out for
different treatment and may create considerable tension with the Nation's widely shared
commitment to evaluating individuals upon their individual merit." Id.
185. Bakke, 438 U.S. at 298.
186. Michael M., 450 U.S. at 478 (Stewart, J., concurring) (citations omitted) ("Gender-
based classifications may not be based upon ... archaic assumptions about the proper roles
of the sexes.")
187. Id. (citation omitted). See J. Morris Clark, Legislative Motivation and Fundamen-
tal Rights in Constitutional Law, 15 SAN DIGo L. REv. 953, 965 (1978) (arguing that invid-
ious discrimination need not involve a malicious or even conscious discounting of
individuals; many legislators who passed sexually discriminatory laws sincerely believed
that they were benefiting women.); Stuart W. Tisdale Jr., Comment, Reasonable Accom-
modation and Non-Invidious Discrimination Under the Maine Human Rights Act, 40 ME.
L. REv. 475, 486 (Invidious motivation includes the malicious desire to relegate a particu-
lar group to second class citizenship or the more subtle, pernicious attitude that singles out
an identifiable group for special protection because of the belief that the group's inferiority
requires solicitude.).
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ate which statutes promote outmoded or current views about a class,
and which legislatures or agencies can be trusted to have accurate
views about that class. The Court has been inconsistent with respect
to which "realistic" differences it will take judicial cognizance of and
whose judgment will be used to determine which differences are
realistic.
In Orr v. Orr, the Court struck down a statute designed to protect
women, despite the Alabama legislature's apparent belief that the
statute reflected a realistic difference between the sexes.'88 In
Michael M. v. Superior Court of Sonoma County, the Court upheld a
statute "where the gender classification [was] not invidious, but rather
realistically reflect[ed] the fact that the sexes are not similarly situated
in certain circumstances."' 1 9 The Court refused to substitute its own
judgment about the proper role of women, claiming that the "decision
of the California Legislature is as good a source as is this Court in
deciding what is 'current' and what is 'outmoded' in the perception of
women."
190
In Rotsker v. Goldberg,'9' the Court refused to decide whether
combat restrictions on women involved an invidious discrimination,
deferring to the judgment of Congress. Given the permissibility of the
restriction, the Court upheld a policy which distinguished between
men and women for draft purposes. "Men and women, because of the
combat restrictions on women, are simply not similarly situated for
purposes of a draft or registration for a draft."' 9
Perhaps the above position is not surprising. If indeed combat
restrictions are constitutionally permissible and if indeed the number
of noncombat personnel required by the Armed Forces is sufficiently
small that it would be counterproductive to draft noncombat person-
nel, the Court should have no qualms about upholding the constitu-
tionality of a facially discriminatory draft. Yet, the Court did have
some constitutional qualms about such a policy. In Personnel Admin-
istrator of Massachusetts v. Feeney, 93 the Court implied that the draft
might involve invidious discrimination.194 Because the history of dis-
crimination against women in the military [was] not on trial in Fee-
188. 440 U.S. 268 (1979).
189. 450 U.S. 464, 469 (1981).
190. Id. at 471 n.6.
i91. 453 U.S. 57 (1981).
192. Id. at 78.
193. 442 U.S. 256 (1979).
194. Id. at 278 (citations omitted) ("The enlistment policies of the Armed Services may
well have discriminated on the basis of sex.").
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ney,195 however, the Court upheld Massachusetts' policy of giving
hiring preferences for individuals who perform military service. The
difficulty here was not that veterans are rewarded for their service,
but merely that the Court should be more consistent with respect to
which differences reflect reality and with respect to who will be
trusted to decide which differences are real.
4. Recognizing Formal but Not Substantive Equality
When the Court wants to uphold a discriminatory policy, it will
sometimes demand only that the policy meet certain formal require-
ments. For example, in Geduldig v. Aiello,19 6 the Court upheld Cali-
fornia's refusal to offer pregnancy insurance benefits for public
employees. The Court noted that the state had a "legitimate interest
in maintaining the self-supporting nature of its insurance program"
and held that the state's legitimate interests provided "an objective
and wholly noninvidious basis for the State's decision not to create a
more comprehensive insurance program than it has."1" The Court
denied that "the selection of the risks insured by the program worked
to discriminate against any definable group or class," pointing out that
there "is no risk from which men are protected and women are not.
Likewise, there is no risk from which women are protected and men
are not.
198
The Court held that no invidious distinction had been made, sug-
gesting that the "program divides potential recipients into two
groups-pregnant women and nonpregnant persons." 199 The Court
noted that "[w]hile the first group is exclusively female, the second
includes members of both sexes," concluding that the "fiscal and actu-
arial benefits of the program thus accrue to members of both
sexes.
' 20 °
The Court offered a similar analysis in General Electric v. Gil-
bert,201 this time explaining that the refusal to offer pregnancy benefits
did not violate Title VII.202 Justice Brennan argued that this same
principle might be used to justify something obviously unconstitu-
195. Id. (citations omitted).
196. 417 U.S. 484 (1974).
197. Id. at 496-97 (footnote omitted).
198. Id. (footnote omitted).
199. Id. at 496-97 n.20.
200. Id.
201. 429 U.S. 125 (1976).
202. Id. at 136.
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tional.W3 In a narrow sense of intention, the goals of General Electric
and the state of California presumably did not involve discrimination
against women. It is clear, however, that an inevitable effect of these
policies would be to disadvantage women. Thus, these policies would
be discriminatory using a broad sense of intention.
In Geduldig and in General Electric, the Court did not worry
about whether the failure to provide insurance coverage for pregnant
women might have been viewed by those adversely affected as a bla-
tant attempt to discriminate. In cases involving affirmative action,
however, the Court worries about the possible reactions of the indi-
viduals adversely affected by the legislation; for example, individuals
who, because of the adoption of an affirmative action policy, do not
receive a benefit they otherwise would have received. The Court's
inconsistency with respect to when the reactions of those adversely
affected will be given weight does little to bolster the Court's reputa-
tion for fairness. By the same token, the Court's use of a very narrow
view of intention in upholding certain arguably intentionally discrimi-
natory statutes or policies and use of a broader view in striking down
other statutes or policies, which seem no more intentionally discrimi-
natory than those upheld, does not engender feelings of confidence in
the Court's ability to make rulings evenhandedly and impartially.
H1. Affirmative Action in Education and Employment
The Court has made clear that a statute or policy might offend
Title VII without offending the Constitution-a higher standard must
be met in order to establish that a particular statute or policy is invidi-
ous in a constitutional sense.2°4 It is helpful to examine the Court's
recent pronouncements on these two different standards because the
Court's views on one tend to cast light on its views on the other.
203. Id. at 152 n.5 (Brennan, J., dissenting) ("Had General Electric assembled a cata-
logue of all ailments that befall humanity, and then systematically proceeded to exclude
from coverage every disability that is female-specific or predominantly afflicts women, the
Court could still reason as here that the plan operates equally: Women, like men, would be
entitled to draw disability payments for their circumcisions and prostatectomies, and
neither sex could claim payment for pregnancies, breast cancer, and the other excluded
female-dominated disabilities. Along similar lines, any disability that occurs disproportion-
ately in a particular group-sickle-cell anemia, for example--could be freely excluded
from the plan without troubling the Court's analytical framework.").
204. See Washington v. Davis, 426 U.S. 229, 239 (1976).
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A. Benign Discrimination in Education: Bakke and Its Implications
Commentators suggest that invidious discrimination in the educa-
tional setting may be even more pernicious than in other areas, be-
cause its victims will thereby be precluded from competing on an
equal footing in other areas of life as well. 205 It is thus imperative that
invidious discrimination in education be prevented. The difficult issue
involves determining which kinds of discrimination in education are in
fact invidious.
Some commentators argue that all race-conscious policies in pub-
lic education are invidious and prohibited by Brown v. Board of Edu-
cation ,2°6 regardless of whether anyone suffers harm.2 7 To prohibit
all race-conscious policies, however, may be quite counterproductive
because such a prohibition may simply allow covert discrimination to
continue, paradoxically, in the name of faimess.20 s Individuals who
wish to discriminate invidiously will continue to do so, although hiding
their illicit motivation.0 9 Individuals who wish to discriminate be-
nignly because of past societal discrimination will have a much more
difficult task-they may have to establish their own past invidious dis-
crimination in order to justify their benign discrimination. 10
205. See Michel Rosenfeld, Affirmative Action, Justice, and Equalities: A Philosophical
and Constitutional Appraisal, 46 OHIO ST. L.J. 845, 906 (1985) (arguing that one of the
principal evils of invidious discrimination in education is that it deprives its victims of the
means to compete on an equal footing with others for scarce jobs).
206. 347 U.S. 483 (1954).
207. See Heyman, supra note 172, at 105 (arguing that Brown establishes the proposi-
tion that the Fourteenth Amendment renders invalid laws employing racial classification in
public education regardless of harm). But see Morris, supra note 176, at 19 ("Brown's
holding ... is that only those racial classifications used by a state that have the effect of
stigmatizing and imposing detriments on a racial group in the field of education are invidi-
ous and thus violate ... equal protection.").
208. See Donald E. Lively, The Supreme Court and Affirmative Action: Whose Classifi-
cation Is Suspect? 17 HASTINGS CONsT. L.Q. 483, 486 (1990) ("If a competition were con-
ducted to determine the most effective means for paying tribute to minority interests in
word but not deed, it is doubtful that any methodology would surpass the discriminatory
purpose standard."); Terrance Sandalow, Racial Preferences in Higher Education: Political
Responsibility and the Judicial Role, 42 U. CH. L. REv. 653, 692 (1975) ("Racial and ethnic
preferences are... the most [if not] only feasible means of achieving substantial represen-
tation of certain racial and ethnic groups in law schools.").
209. Cf Cafeteria & Restaurant Workers Union, Local 473, AFL-CIO v. McElroy, 367
U.S. 886, 900 (1961) (Brennan, J., dissenting) ("[U]nless the government official is foolish
enough to admit what he is doing-and few will be so foolish after today's decision-he
may employ 'security requirements' as a blind behind which to dismiss at will for the most
discriminatory of causes."); Lively, supra note 208, at 486 ("When officials are on notice
that they must conceal illicit motive to avoid constitutional consequences, searching for
wrongful intent becomes an exercise well known for its futility.").
210. See Ronald W. Adelman, Note, Voluntary Affirmative Action Plans by Public Em-
ployers: The Disparity in Standards Between Title VII and the Equal Protection Clause, 56
The Court continues to emphasize the difference between facial
and nonfacial discrimination. "[T]he differentiating factor between de
jure segregation and so-called de facto segregation... is purpose or
intent to discriminate." '211 Invidiousness in education must be linked
to a racially discriminatory purpose.212
Even absent a showing of a facial intent to discriminate, the
Court may infer invidiously discriminatory intent from the circum-
stances. For example, "where a school system has been operated on a
segregated basis in the past, and where ostensibly neutral attendance
zones or district lines are drawn where none have existed before," the
Court members will "not close [their] eyes to the facts in favor of the-
ory. ' 213 Further, the mere recitation of noninvidious motivation will
not establish the good faith of the school authorities. 1 4
The question of interest, here, however is not whether the Court
should prevent counties from having segregated schools, but whether
a school's preferential admissions for minorities constitutes an invidi-
ous discrimination prohibited by the Constitution. Such a policy may
be facially discriminatory, but not intended to stigmatize or adversely
affect anyone. Thus, there is an important difference between an at-
tempt to bring about segregation-which is often both intended to
FoRD~mi L. Rv. 403, 405 (1987) (Plaintiffs attacking affirmative action must prove that
past school board action was not illegal racial discrimination or that past racial discrimina-
tion was not the board's. The school board must prove itself guilty of past discrimination.);
id. ("Under the guise of strict judicial scrutiny of racial or gender classifications, the stan-
dard appears to require a showing of actual past discrimination by the employer or his
predecessors."). But see Wygant, 476 U.S. at 286 (O'Connor, J., concurring) (noting that
remedial affirmative action need not be accompanied by contemporaneous findings of ac-
tual discrimination as long as public actor has a firm basis for believing that remedial ac-
tion is required); id. at 290 (O'Connor, J., concurring) ("The imposition of a requirement
that public employers make findings that they have engaged in illegal discrimination before
they engage in affirmative action programs would severely undermine public employers'
incentive to meet voluntarily their civil rights obligations."). See also id. at 305 (Marshall,
J., dissenting) ("[fEormal findings of past discrimination are not a necessary predicate to
the adoption of affirmative-action policies, and... the scope of such policies need not be
limited to remedying specific instances of identifiable discrimination.").
211. Keyes v. School Dist., 413 U.S. 189, 208 (1973) (citing Swann v. Charlotte-Meck-
lenburg of Educ., 402 U.S. 1, 17-18 (1971)).
212. Washington v. Davis, 426 U.S. 229, 240 (1976) ("The school desegregation cases
have.., adhered to the basic equal protection principle that the invidious quality of a law
claimed to be racially discriminatory must ultimately be traced to a racially discriminatory
purpose.").
213. Wright v. Council of City of Emporia, 407 U.S. 451, 472 (1972) (Burger, J.,
dissenting).
214. Keyes, 413 U.S. at 210 ("[It is not enough ... that the school authorities rely upon
some allegedly logical, racially neutral explanation for their actions. Their burden is to
adduce proof sufficient to support a finding that segregative intent was not among the
factors that motivated their actions.").
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stigmatize and invidiously motivated-and an attempt to increase in-
tegration-which often involves neither an illicit motivation nor an
illicit intention.
In the graduate school setting, the Court has not held that a pref-
erential admissions policy is per se unconstitutional. Such preferential
programs are acceptable, as long as they consider race as one factor
among many which might enhance an individual applicant's chances
of being accepted.215 The Court, however, has refused to uphold mi-
nority set-asides. In Bakke, the plurality suggested that a university's
interest in seeking "to assure within its student body some specified
percentage of a particular group merely because of its race or ethnic
origin... must be rejected not as insubstantial but as facially invalid,"
because the university's "[p]reference for members of any one group
for no reason other than race or ethnic origin is discrimination for its
own sake. 2 1
6
It is hardly accurate to say that affirmative action policies involve
discrimination for its own sake. Rather, such policies promote a vari-
ety of goals, for example, assuring diversity or compensating for past
discrimination either by society as a whole or by the institution itself.
It might seem that the Court would not object to a university's insti-
tuting an affirmative action policy if the university had itself discrimi-
nated against minorities in the past. While that may be true, the
Bakke plurality rejected the proposition that a university could deter-
mine that it itself had engaged in discriminatory practices. The Uni-
versity's purpose "is education, not... the adjudication of particular
claims of illegality. '217 To justify a policy of facial benign discrimina-
tion, a governmental body, rather than the university itself, must "es-
tablish, in the record, that the classification is responsive to identified
discrimination." ' 8
Yet, there are a number of reasons why this is a surprising tack
for the Court to take. In other contexts, where someone admits hav-
ing acted wrongfully in the past, the Court does not require an in-
dependent fact-finder to verify that the wrong had in fact occurred
before allowing the admitted wrongdoer to make amends. Indeed, in
other contexts, persons accused of wrongdoing are sometimes allowed
to make compensation, for example, by paying a certain amount or by
215. Regents of the Univ. of Calif. v. Bakke, 438 U.S. 265 (1978).
216. Bakke, 438 U.S. at 307.
217. Bakke, 438 U.S. at 309 (footnote omitted).
218. Id. (footnote omitted).
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changing internal procedures, without having to admit, much less es-
tablish, wrongdoing.
The Bakke plurality was disingenuous when charging that the
university, by adopting its affirmative action policy, had been engag-
ing in discrimination for its own sake. Basically, the plurality rejected
a number of other justifications and then concluded that the university
could not justify its policy.219 For example, the plurality held that "the
purpose of helping certain groups ... perceived as victims of 'societal
discrimination' does not justify a classification that imposes disadvan-
tages upon persons.., who bear no responsibility for whatever harm
the beneficiaries of the special admissions program are thought to
have suffered." 2' Allegedly, allowing such policies would cause a
host of problems. "To hold otherwise would be to convert a remedy
heretofore reserved for violations of legal rights into a privilege that
all institutions throughout the Nation could grant at their pleasure to
whatever groups are perceived as victims of societal
discrimination."'"
There are several difficulties with the plurality's position. First,
there is no reason to believe that a university's voluntarily-adopted
race-conscious admissions program would result in minority members
taking more than their fair share of slots.' Second, the plurality's
references to groups that are "perceived as victims," or who are
"thought to have suffered" suggests that blacks may not have suffered
or do not still suffer discrimination in this country.2' Third, even if
the adoption of such a program would be unwise, the Court's sugges-
tion that the policy involves discrimination for its own sake is too
strong. There was no evidence that the university had adopted the
program out of animus or out of a desire to stigmatize or even because
it held illegitimate notions of racial inferiority as background beliefs.
While denying the constitutionality of a university's adopting a
race-conscious program to remedy past societal discrimination, the
Bakke plurality affirmed the constitutionality of a university's imple-
menting a system to attain "a diverse student body."' 4 Indeed, "the
interest of diversity is compelling in the context of a university's ad-
219. In Freeman v. Pitts, 112 S. Ct. 1430 (1992), the Court suggested, "Racial balance is
not to be achieved for its own sake. It is to be pursued when racial imbalance has been
caused by a constitutional violation." Id. at 1447.
220. Bakke, 438 U.S. at 310.
221. Id.
222. See supra text accompanying note 131.
223. See infra text accompanying notes 325-26.
224. Bakke, 438 U.S. at 311-12.
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missions program." 2' Nonetheless, the particular admissions pro-
gram at issue in Bakke was struck down because the plurality
substituted its own judgment for the university's and decided that the
university's "racial classification [was not] necessary to promote this
interest. 226
1. Facial Discrimination and Quotas
One of the more confusing aspects of the controversy surround-
ing affirmative action in higher education is that there has been a con-
flation of facial discrimination with the imposition of quotas. An
admissions program which considers race or ethnicity a "plus" in a
particular applicant's file will be upheld, as long as the admissions pro-
gram does "not insulate the individual from comparison with all other
candidates for the available seats."227 A permissible admissions pro-
gram must be "flexible enough to consider all pertinent elements of
diversity in light of the particular qualifications of each applicant, and
to place them on the same footing for consideration, although not nec-
essarily according them the same weight." 2' Even in such a program,
some applicants may not be accepted because they do not have the
racial "plus" factor. However, the
applicant who loses out on the last available seat to another can-
didate receiving a "plus" on the basis of ethnic background will
not have been foreclosed from all consideration for that seat
simply because he was not the right color or had the wrong sur-
name. It would mean only that his combined qualifications,
which may have included similar nonobjective factors, did not
outweigh those of the other applicant.22
The plurality distinguishes the above kind of program which facially
considers race to be one of the factors of admission from a program in
which a necessary condition for being awarded a particular slot is that
the applicant be of a particular race. The latter involves a "facial in-
tent to discriminate."230 No facial infirmity exists where ethnic back-
ground or race is only one factor to be considered in conjunction with
other factors.231
225. Id. at 314-15.
226. Id.
227. Bakke, 438 U.S. at 317.
228. Id.
229. Id. at 318.
230. Id.
231. Id.
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2. Reserving Slots Versus Recognizing Plus Factors
It is misleading to say that a program is "facially" discriminatory
if certain slots are reserved for individuals of a particular race but not
"facially" discriminatory if race is but one of several weighted factors.
In both cases, race consideration is explicitly a facial consideration of
the program. Indeed, given that the Court will not oversee how heav-
ily each factor is weighted, the two admissions programs might yield
identical results." 2 The Bakke plurality realized this, but suggested
that "a court would not assume that a university, professing to employ
a facially nondiscriminatory admissions policy, would operate it as a
cover for the functional equivalent of a quota system." 3
Suppose that a university were to deny that its admissions policy
involved invidious facial discrimination because it merely assigned a
"minus" factor to an individual's being African-American rather than
simply rejected him on that account. The Court would (presumably)
hold that this was an invidious, facially discriminatory policy.
Apparently, the Bakke plurality is not worried about facially dis-
criminatory admissions policies per se; rather, it is worried about
facially discriminatory policies based on the sole criterion of race.
Yet, it is inaccurate to depict the admissions program at issue in Bakke
as facially discriminating on the one criterion of race-it is not as if
the university set aside a particular number of slots for individuals of a
particular race and then filled those slots by choosing randomly
among the relevant applicants. Rather, the best minority candidates
were chosen through a nonrandom process. This might be likened to
a process in which a university reserves a number of slots for the chil-
dren of alumni, and then chooses the best candidates among that
group.
The Bakke plurality would also find offensive an admissions pro-
gram which had a "goal" of admitting a certain number of students of
a particular race. "Whether this limitation is described as a quota or a
goal, it is a line drawn on the basis of race and ethnic status."'234 The
plurality notes, "The guarantee of equal protection cannot mean one
thing when applied to one individual and something else when applied
to a person of a different color. If both are not accorded the same
232. I at 369 (Brennan, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part) (holding that no
sensible or constitutional distinction between adding a set number of points to the admis-
sions rating of disadvantaged minority applicants and setting a fixed number of places for
such applicants).
233. Id. at 318.
234. Id. at 289 (footnote omitted).
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protection, then it is not equal." 5 The plurality view echoes a posi-
tion articulated by Justice Rehnquist. "Whether described as 'benign
discrimination' or 'affirmative action,' the racial quota is nonetheless a
creator of castes, a two-edged sword that must demean one in order to
prefer another.' '1 36 Apparently, this is true even if there is no sugges-
tion that the program stigmatizes or singles out any identifiable,
nonminority group. 37
It is surprising that the Bakke plurality equates quotas and goals,
finding both invidious regardless of motivation, intention, or effect.
One would have-expected the Court to distinguish between the two.
Quotas might be thought invidious and demeaning because in the ex-
treme case an unqualified person might be accepted to fill the quota.
With a system of goals or targets, however, there is no requirement
that a certain number of individuals be admitted and thus, in the hy-
pothesized extreme case, the unqualified person would not be admit-
ted and the goal would not be reached that year.
There are other difficulties with the plurality's position. For ex-
ample, consider two admission policies, one which considers race
among several factors and the other which reserves certain slots for
individuals of a particular race, as long as those individuals have
scored above the cut-off point on the relevant test such as the SAT,
LSAT, or MCAT. The motivation (benevolence or duty), the inten-
tion (to achieve diversity), and the effect (accepting a certain number
of students) might be identical in both cases. Nonetheless, the Court
would strike down the latter but not the former admissions program.
Universities cannot be assured of circumventing Bakke by adopt-
ing multi-factored approaches which would roughly approximate the
results which they would have achieved by reserving slots. It is not at
all clear that the Court would uphold any admissions program which
used several factors in its admissions decision-making, regardless of
the relative weight given to each factor. The Court might decide that
a particular program was "the functional equivalent of a quota sys-
tem," 8 no longer presume "good faith" 39 on the part of the univer-
sity, and might then become even more intrusive in admissions
procedures. Indeed, given the aversion to affirmative action policies
manifested in Bakke, it would be unsurprising for the Court to be-
235. Bakke, 438 U.S. at 289-90.
236. United Steelworkers of America, AFL-CIO-CLC v. Weber, 443 U.S. 193, 254
(1979) (Rehnquist, J., dissenting).
237. Bakke, 438 U.S. at 369 (Brennan, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part).
238. Id. at 318.
239. Id. at 318-19.
come even more aggressive in striking down university affirmative ac-
tion programs.
The Bakke plurality worried that "innocent" applicants will be
resentful if denied admission because some slots have been reserved
for minorities. Individuals may be no less resentful, however, for hav-
ing been rejected for want of a "plus" factor than they would be for
having been rejected because slots were reserved. Indeed, many stu-
dents do not know whether the university they desire to attend has an
affirmative action policy or, if it does, how it achieves its admissions
goals. These students might perceive the university's admissions pol-
icy as invidious, regardless of the policy's content. The would-be stu-
dent who knows that race is but one of several factors considered in
admissions might still be resentful if she is not admitted, especially if
she does not know how heavily that factor is weighed.
The Supreme Court's implicit messages are rather disquieting.
The Bakke plurality suggested that race should be treated the same
way that other distinguishing features are treated. Race contributes to
diversity as does "unique work or service experience, leadership po-
tential, maturity, demonstrated compassion, a history of overcoming
disadvantage, ability to communicate with the poor,"'2 ° etc. The
Court thus trivializes the role of race in our country.241 Perhaps the
more dangerous message is the one implicit in several of the Court's
recent decisions,242 namely, that race is inappropriately considered in
any but the most limited of contexts, regardless of motivation, inten-
tion, or consequences, and further, that the use of race as a considera-
tion is appropriately resented. What better way to prevent the
rectification of past and current racial injustice than to claim that the
remedy itself is appropriately resented as racist.
B. The Role of Congress
One of the reasons that universities are not allowed to set up
race-conscious quotas, even if they are guilty of past discrimination, is
that they are allegedly unequipped to make the relevant factual find-
ing. 43 The Court will not approve "a classification that aids persons
240. Id. at 317.
241. See Lawrence, supra note 1, at 323 (discussing "the profound effect that the history
of American race relations has had on the individual and collective unconscious").
242. See, eg., Freeman v. Pitts, 112 S. Ct. 1430 (1992); Board of Education of Oklahoma
City Public Schools v. Dowell, 498 U.S. 237 (1991); Wards Cove Packing v. Atonio, 490
U.S. 642 (1989); and City of Richmond v. L A. Croson Company, 488 U.S. 469 (1989)
(plurality opinion).
243. See Bakke, 438 U.S. at 309 (footnote omitted).
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perceived as members of relatively victimized groups at the expense
of other innocent individuals in the absence of judicial, legislative, or
administrative findings of constitutional or statutory violations." 2 4
While "government bodies constitutionally may adopt racial clas-
sifications as a remedy for past discrimination,"'245 such classifications
will face heightened or strict scrutiny. In Croson,2 6 the Court made
clear that a municipal government set-aside program will be examined
with strict scrutiny. 47
The Court is not thereby barring states from adopting remedial
programs,248 although state and local governments "must identify that
discrimination, public or private, with some specificity before they
may use race-conscious relief."'2 9 The Court gives more deference to
Congressional findings, feeling bound to give "appropriate deference
to the Congress, a co-equal branch charged by the Constitution with
the power to 'provide for the.., general Welfare of the United States'
and 'to enforce, by appropriate legislation,' the equal protection guar-
antees of the Fourteenth Amendment."" 0
244. Id. at 307.
245. Local 28 of Sheet Metal Worker's Int. Assoc. v. Equal Employment Opportunity
Comm., 478 U.S. 421, 480 (1986).
246. 488 U.S. 469 (1989) (plurality opinion).
247. Cf id. at 490, where the Court noted,
The mere recitation of a benign or compensatory purpose for the use of a racial
classification would essentially entitle the States to exercise the full power of Con-
gress under § 5 of the Fourteenth Amendment and insulate any racial classifica-
tion from judicial scrutiny under § 1. We believe that such a result would be
contrary to the intentions of the Framers of the Fourteenth Amendment, who
desired to place clear limits on the State's use of race as a criterion for legislative
action, and to have the federal courts enforce those limitations.
248. Id. at 504 ("[Ihe States and their subdivisions may take remedial action when
they possess evidence that their own spending practices are exacerbating a pattern of prior
discrimination.").
249. Id.
250. Fullilove, 448 U.S. at 472 (citing U.S. CONST. art. 1, § 8, cl. 1; U.S. CONsT. amend
XIV, § 5). In Metro Broadcasting, 497 U.S. at 564-65 (footnote omitted), the Court held
that "benign race-conscious measures mandated by Congress... are constitutionally per-
missible to the extent that they serve important governmental objectives within the power
of Congress and are substantially related to achievement of those objectives." In Fullilove,
448 U.S. at 483-84, the Court recognized as "fundamental that in no organ of government,
state or federal, does there repose a more comprehensive remedial power than in the Con-
gress, expressly charged by the Constitution with competence and authority to enforce
equal protection guarantees." Further, the Court rejected "the contention that in the re-
medial context the Congress must act in wholly,'color-blind' fashion." Id. at 482. See also
J. Edmond Nathanson, Congressional Power to Contradict the Supreme Court's Constitu-
tional Decisions: Accommodation of Rights in Conflict, 27 WM. & MARY L. Ray. 331, 336
(1986) (noting that in Fullilove, the Court allowed Congress to use its Fourteenth Amend-
ment enforcement power to establish affirmative action quotas for minority business
participation).
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As Justice Scalia explains, the Court quite consciously distin-
guishes between federal action on the one hand and state and local
action on the other. The distinction "between federal and state (or
local) action based on race rests not only upon the substance of the
Civil War Amendments, but upon social reality and governmental the-
ory." According to Justice Scalia, the Court believes that "the dis-
passionate objectivity [and] the flexibility that are needed to mold a
race-conscious remedy around the single objective of eliminating the
effects of past or present discrimination.., are substantially less likely
to exist at the state or local level." 2
Merely because Congress, rather than a state or locality, adopts a
particular policy does not "render it immune from judicial scru-
tiny.''123 That scrutiny will not be strict, however, as it would be were
a municipality to adopt the same kind of program.z 4 Rather, it will
be heightened.255 The program merely needs to be substantially re-
lated to an important governmental interest (the heightened scrutiny
test) rather than narrowly tailored to promote a compelling state in-
terest under the strict scrutiny test.
It might seem that the Court is allowing the following scenario: In
its fact-finding role, Congress might find pervasive discrimination in a
variety of areas. States and municipalities might then adopt benign
discrimination policies based on the congressional fact-finding. The
Court, however, will not allow this. "[W]hen a legislative body
chooses to employ a suspect classification, it cannot rest upon a gener-
alized assertion to the classification's relevance to its goals." 6 The
Court noted, "Congress has made national findings that there has
been societal discrimination in a host of fields. If all state or local
government need do is find a congressional report on the subject to
251. Croson, 488 U.S. at 522 (Scalia, J., concurring in the judgment).
252. Id. (Scalia, J., concurring in the judgment) (citing Fullilove, 448 U.S. at 527 (Stew-
art, J. dissenting)). But see Metro Broadcasting, 497 U.S. at 603 (O'Connor, J. dissenting)
("The Court's application of a lessened equal protection standard to congressional actions
finds no support in our cases or in the Constitution.") and id. at 605 (O'Connor, J. dissent-
ing) ("the Court does not lightly set aside the considered judgement of a coordinate
branch. Nonetheless, the respect due to a coordinate branch yields neither less vigilance in
defense of equal protection principles nor any corresponding diminution of the standard of
review."
253. Fullilove, 448 U.S. at 473.
254. Cf Metro Broadcasting, 497 U.S. at 564-65 (citing Croson, 488 U.S. 469 (1989)).
255. Id, at 597 ("a congressionally mandated benign race-conscious program that is sub-
stantially related to the achievement of an important governmental interest is consistent
with equal protection principles so long as it does not impose undue burdens on
nonminorities.")
256. Croson, 488 U.S. at 500.
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enact a set-aside program, the constraints on the Equal Protection
Clause will, in effect, have been rendered a nullity. '' 257 The state or
local government will have to make particularized findings of past dis-
crimination to justify its instituting an affirmative action program.
The Court's approach is rather surprising. Its presumption re-
garding the likelihood of a race-conscious remedy being invidious is
based on the identity of its creator rather than on the content of the
policy. Further, despite its alleged deference to Congress, the Court
gives short shrift to Congressional findings of discrimination, instead
requiring state and local actors to identify discriminatory policies and-
practices with particularity. It would be unsurprising for someone
reading the Court's decisions to conclude that the Court is not really
interested in rectifying past and present discrimination, protestations
notwithstanding.
C. Tite VII
One of the most discussed and litigated Congressional enact-
ments in discrimination law is Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of
1964, 5 which prohibits intentional employment discrimination
against certain groups. There are several reasons for the large amount
of litigation arising from Title VII, not the least of which is that the
Court has not been entirely consistent with respect to what the Act
requires.
The Court has made clear that the standards for invidious dis-
crimination that makes legislation constitutionally infirm are not iden-
tical to the standards for violations of Title VII.3 9 The absence of
animus will not prevent an intentionally discriminatory policy from
offending the Act. "IT]he absence of a malevolent motive does not
convert a facially discriminatory policy into a neutral policy with a
discriminatory effect. Whether an employment practice involves dis-
parate treatment through explicit facial discrimination does not de-
pend on why the employer discriminates but rather on the explicit
terms of the discrimination. 2 60
Although the criteria for constitutional violations and Title VII
violations differ, examining Title VII jurisprudence clarifies the shifts
257. Id. at 504.
258. 42 U.S.C.A § 2000(e) (West 1981).
259. Washington v. Davis, 426 U.S. 229,239 (1976) ("We have never held that the con-
stitutional standard for adjudicating claims of invidious racial discrimination is identical to
the standards applicable under Title VII.").
260. International Union, United Auto., Aerospace and Agric. Implement Workers of
America v. Johnson Controls, 111 S. Ct. 1196, 1203-04 (1991).
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in the Court's position with respect to whose interests must be
weighed more heavily and with respect to which presumptions will be
employed by the Court. In cases involving either kind of violation,
the Court has made it more difficult to establish that discrimination
against minorities has occurred and more difficult to establish the per-
missibility of affirmative action programs. The implicit suggestion is
that the Court has lost its resolve to eradicate discrimination against
minorities in this country.
1. Two Different Kinds of Title VII Violations
In Title VII cases, the complainant might take two different tacks.
On the one hand, the complainant might have been personally dis-
criminated against on the basis of race or sex.2 6i1 Here, the individual
might point to specific comments made by management to establish
that there was discrimination in her case.262
On the other hand, the complainant might argue that the employ-
ment policy had an unjustified disparate impact. Even if an employ-
ment policy was facially neutral and thus did not involve a facial
intention to discriminate, it might nonetheless violate the Act.
"[G]ood intent or absence of discriminatory intent does not redeem
employment procedures or testing mechanisms that operate as 'built-
in headwinds' for minority groups and are unrelated to measuring job
capability."2 63 The Court recognizes that "a prima facie violation of
Title VII can be established in some circumstances upon proof that
the effect of an otherwise facially neutral plan or classification is to
discriminate against members of one class or another."2" The Court
has held that "facially neutral employment practices that have signifi-
cant adverse effects on protected groups... [may] violate the [Civil
Rights] Act without proof that the employer adopted those practices
with a discriminatory intent."265 In these kinds of cases, the evidence
"usually focuses on statistical disparities, rather than specific inci-
dents, and on competing explanations for those disparities. 2 66 If
there is no innocent explanation for the disparities, the Court will pre-
261. See Price Waterhouse v. Hopkins, 490 U.S. 228 (1989) (holding that particular indi-
vidual denied promotion because she was not sufficiently feminine).
262. See id at 251 (stereotypical remarks used as evidence of gender bias).
263. Griggs v. Duke Power Co., 401 U.S. 424, 432 (1971).
264. General Electric Co. v. Gilbert, 429 U.S. 125, 137 (1976) (emphasis in original)
(citing Washington v. Davis, 426 U.S. 229, 246-48 (1976)).
265. Watson v. Fort Worth Bank and Trust, 487 U.S. 977, 986-87 (1988) (emphasis in
original).
266. Id. at 987.
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sume that the employer intended to discriminate. "[W]hen all legiti-
mate reasons for rejecting an applicant have been eliminated as
possible reasons for the employer's actions, it is more likely than not
the employer, who we generally assume acts only with some reason,
based his decision on an impermissible consideration such as race. '267
The Court does not insist that an individual applicant establish
that when she applied for the job her race was explicitly discussed and
was the reason that she was not offered a job. As Justice Powell ex-
plained, the plaintiff may simply show that "an employer's selection
process results in the rejection of a disproportionate number of mem-
bers of a protected group to which he belongs. '268 Once the discrimi-
natory pattern is established, the Court will presume that the
applicant was the subject of discrimination unless the employer can
show that the person would not have been hired in any case. "The
proof of the pattern or practice supports an inference that any particu-
lar employment decision, during the period in which the discrimina-
tory policy was in force, was made in pursuit of that policy."269 To be
entitled to relief, an "alleged individual discriminatee" would merely
need to show that she had "unsuccessfully applied for a job and there-
fore was a potential victim of the proved discrimination."270
The Court is wise not to require in disparate impact cases that
would-be employees prove that they in particular had been the victims
of discrimination. The burden should be on the employer. To hold
otherwise would erect a barrier very difficult if not impossible for the
complainant to overcome.
2. The Court's Compromise
The Court's policy involves a compromise. It erects a presump-
tion in favor of the applicant, but requires that the person have in fact
applied for the job in order to be eligible for relief. Individuals who
were dissuaded from applying (because they knew it would simply be
a waste of time) will not be compensated. The policy excludes "from
the Act's coverage the victims of the most entrenched forms of dis-
crimination. Victims of gross and pervasive discrimination [can] be
denied relief precisely because the unlawful practices had been so suc-
cessful as totally to deter [their] job applications .. 271
267. Furnco Constr. Corp. v. Waters, 438 U.S. 567, 577 (1978).
268. Connecticut v. Teal, 457 U.S. 440, 458-59 (1982) (Powell, J., dissenting).
269. International Bhd. of Teamsters v. United States, 431 U.S. 324, 362 (1977).
270. Id.
271. Id. at 367.
The Court's position is sensible, given both the difficulty in deter-
mining which would-be applicants were in fact dissuaded from apply-
ing because of discriminatory hiring practices, and the Court's
willingness to impose class-wide remedies which assure that such prac-
tices will not continue. While it is unfortunate that those deterred
from applying because of discriminatory hiring practices will not be
compensated and will have suffered a real injustice without receiving
redress, there is at least the consolation that others (and, perhaps,
those individuals themselves) will no longer be subjected to such dis-
crimination. Precisely because of the likelihood that individuals in
fact discriminated against will have been wronged and not compen-
sated, however, the Court must not make it overly difficult to establish
disparate impact. Regrettably, the Court has recently changed the
terms of the compromise, becoming less willing to impose class-wide
remedies and more insistent that intentional discrimination on the
part of the employer be established.272
If one can establish that there was a pattern of discriminatory
treatment, then an applicant denied employment will be presumed to
have been a victim of discrimination. Recently, however, the Court
has limited what inferences will be made, given a showing of disparate
impact. For example, disparate impact in one employment sector will
not establish disparate impact in a different sector of the same firm.
"Racial imbalance in one segment of an employer's work force does
not, without more, establish a prima facie case of disparate impact
with respect to the selection of workers for the employer's other posi-
tions, even where workers for the different positions have somewhat
fungible skills."273 Indeed, the Court has imposed fairly strict require-
ments, insisting that alleged discriminatees demonstrate how the spe-
cific challenged employment practices caused the disparate impact.
The alleged victims must "demonstrate that the disparity they com-
plain of is the result of one or more of the employment practices that
they are attacking..., specifically showing that each challenged prac-
tice has a significantly disparate impact on employment opportunities
for whites and nonwhites."' 74 That this requirement was overly de-
manding may be inferred from Congress' overruling the decision in
the Civil Rights Act of 1991.75
272. See infra notes 290-95 and accompanying text.
273. Wards Cove Packing v. Atonio, 490 U.S. 642, 653 (1989) (citation omitted) (em-
phasis added).
274. Id at 657.
275. See 42 U.S.C.A. § 1981 (West 1981).
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Merely because a business uses employment tests or criteria that
result in statistical disparities in the workforce does not establish that
the business is violating Title VII. The key consideration is whether
the practice can be justified for business reasons. "The touchstone is
business necessity. If an employment practice which operates to ex-
clude Negroes cannot be shown to be related to job performance, the
practice is prohibited."276 Thus, an "employer may not.., condition
employment opportunities on the satisfaction of facially neutral tests
or qualifications that have a disproportionate, adverse impact on
members of protected groups when those tests or qualifications are
not required for performance of the job. '2 77
Suppose that an employer uses job-related tests which "select ap-
plicants for hire or promotion in a racial pattern significantly different
from that of the pool of applicants.2 78 The complaining party will
have the option of showing that "other tests or selection devices, with-
out a similar undesirable racial effect, would also serve the employer's
legitimate interest in 'efficient and trustworthy workmanship.'"279 If
such a showing could be made, this "would be evidence that the em-
ployer was using its tests merely as a 'pretext' for discrimination." 0
The Court distinguishes between two kinds of relief: affirmative
action policies and make-whole relief to individuals who themselves
have been victims of discrimination. Courts have "remedial powers
... both to eradicate the effects of unlawful discrimination as well as
to make the victims of past discrimination whole." 2 1 The remedies
that are appropriate for bringing about these two different kinds of
relief are quite different.
An identified victim of discrimination may be awarded senior-
ity-"a court may award competitive seniority to individuals who
show that they had been discriminated against."282 Indeed, this is true
even if the expectations of other innocent individuals might thereby be
frustrated. Were the Court to deny "seniority relief to identifiable vic-
tims of racial discrimination on the sole ground that such relief dimin-
ishes the expectations of other, arguably innocent, employees, [this]
276. Griggs v. Duke Power Co., 401 U.S. 424, 431 (1971).
277. Price Waterhouse v. Hopkins, 490 U.S. 228, 242 (1989).
278. Albemarle Paper Co. v. Moody, 422 U.S. 405,425 (1975) (citing McDonnell Doug-
las Corp. v. Green, 411 U.S. 792, 802 (1973)).
279. Id. (citing McDonnell Douglas, 411 U.S. at 801).
280. Id. (footnote omitted).
281. Local 28 of Sheet Metal Worker's Int'l. Assn. v. Equal Employment Opportunity
Comm'n, 478 U.S. 421, 471 (1986).
282. Id. at 472-73.
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would if applied generally frustrate the central 'make whole' objective
of Title VII. ' 283
The identified victim of discrimination may also be awarded
back-pay, even if the employer discriminated without any animus.
The relevant consideration is whether the employer discriminated, not
whether the employer acted maliciously. The Court's concern is to
compensate the victim rather than to punish the discriminator. "If
backpay were awardable only upon a showing of bad faith, the rem-
edy would become a punishment for moral turpitude, rather than a
compensation for workers' injuries."2 4 The Court notes that "a
worker's injury is no less real simply because his employer did not
inflict it in 'bad faith."'2 5
The remedies are more limited for violations of Title VII where
there are no identified victims of discrimination. "[A] court can award
competitive seniority only when the beneficiary of the award has actu-
ally been a victim of illegal discrimination." 6 Indeed, the remedy for
a Title VII violation might simply involve an order for the discrimina-
tion to cease. "In most cases, the court need only order the employer
or union to cease engaging in discriminatory practices... ."287 Some-
times, however, stronger steps will be necessary if there is a pattern of
discrimination which is particularly longstanding or egregious. "[I]t
may be necessary to require the employer or union to take affirmative
steps to end discrimination effectively to enforce Title VII where an
283. Franks v. Bowman Tramp. Co., Inc., 424 U.S. 747, 774 (1976). See also United
States v. Paradise, 480 U.S. 149, 188-89 (1987) (Powell, J., concurring) (citation omitted)
("Unlike layoff requirements, the promotion requirement at issue in this case does not
'impose the entire burden of achieving racial equality on particular individuals,' and does
not disrupt seriously the lives of innocent individuals."); Franks, 424 U.S. at 771 ("[T]he
denial of seniority relief to victims of illegal racial discrimination in hiring is permissible
'only for reasons which, if applied generally, would not frustrate the central statutory pur-
poses of eradicating discrimination throughout the economy and making persons whole for
injuries suffered through past discrimination."' (citation omitted)). But see Firefighters
Local Union No. 1784 v. Stotts, 467 U.S. 561, 579 (1984) (citing Teamsters, 431 U.S. at 367-
71) ("[M]ere membership in the disadvantaged class is insufficient to warrant a seniority
award; each individual must prove that the discriminatory practice had an impact on
him."); Franks, 424 U.S. at 780-81 (Burger, C. J., concurring in part and dissenting in part)
("[A]ithough retroactive benefit-type seniority relief may sometimes be appropriate and
equitable, competitive-type seniority relief at the expense of wholly innocent employees
can rarely, if ever, be equitable if that term retains traditional meaning.").
284. Albemarle Paper Co. v. Moody, 422 U.S. 405, 422 (1975).
285. Id. See also Lawrence, supra note 1, at 319 ("[tjhe injury of racial inequality exists
irrespective of the decisionmakers' motives").
286. Firefighters Local Union No. 1784 v. Stotts, 467 U.S. 561, 579-80 (1984) (emphasis
added).
287. Local 28 of Sheet Metal Worker's Int'l. Ass'n v. Equal Employment Opportunity
Comm'n, 478 U.S. 421, 448 (1986).
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employer or union has engaged in particularly longstanding or egre-
gious discrimination."'2 8 In these kinds of cases, the Court may re-
quire "recalcitrant employers or unions to hire and to admit qualified
minorities roughly in proportion to the number of qualified minorities
in the work force" because that "may be the only effective way to
ensure the full enjoyment of the rights protected by Title VII."2
While the Court recognizes that requiring affirmative action poli-
cies may be necessary, it believes that such a remedy should be used
sparingly. The Court denies that "race-conscious affirmative meas-
ures [should] be invoked simply to create a racially balanced work
force."29 Because "an employer [does] not violate the statute merely
by having a racially imbalanced work force,... a court [should] not
order an employer to adopt racial preferences merely to correct such
an imbalance."29' The Court wants to avoid a system in which "any
employer who had a segment of his work force that was.., racially
imbalanced could be haled into court and forced to engage in the ex-
pensive and time-consuming task of defending the 'business necessity'
of [his employment] methods.. . ." The Court believes that were this
the rule, employers would be forced by practical necessity "to adopt
racial quotas."2 '
The Court is trying to balance competing considerations. It wants
to eradicate invidious discrimination but also does not want to "pun-
ish" individuals who have done no wrong, neither by making false ac-
cusations of intentional discrimination nor by requiring the employer
to spend large amounts of money to meet the relevant standard or to
defend his employment methods. The difficulty with the Court's posi-
tion is not something obvious like a refusal to strike policies which it
nonetheless recognizes as invidiously discriminatory, but something
subtle like the Court's being less likely to hold that a given policy or
practice which adversely affects minorities is in fact invidiously dis-
criminatory. Certainly, that would be bad enough, given the growing
subtlety and sophistication of would-be discriminators. What is worse
288. Id.
289. Id. at 448-49.
290. 'Id. at 475.
291. Id. at 453.
292. Wards Cove Packing Co., Inc. v. Atonio, 490 U.S. 642, 652 (1989). See also Con-
necticut v. Teal, 457 U.S. 440, 463-64 (1982) (Powell, J., dissenting) ("For state and local
governmental employers with limited funds, the practical effect of today's decision may
well be the adoption of simple quota hiring. This arbitrary method of employment is itself
unfair to individual applicants, whether or not they are members of minority
groups."(footnote omitted)).
-t- U SO--Sis that the Court is now more likely to hold that a given affirmative
action policy or practice is invidiously discriminatory.
3. Disparate Impact and Fault
A subtle shift regarding which policies are invidious can have sig-
nificant effects. So, too, a subtle shift in definitions or presumptions
can have significant implications. Consider disparate impact. It
would seem clear what that term means-a significantly dispropor-
tionate effect on a relevant group. Yet, the definition of disparate im-
pact is hardly straightforward. For example, the Court may deny that
an employment policy has a disparate impact if the reasonably related
employment criteria or tests act to exclude when the exclusion is not
the defendant's "fault." "If the absence of minorities holding ...
skilled positions is due to a dearth of qualified nonwhite applicants
(for reasons that are not petitioners' fault) petitioners' selection meth-
ods or employment practices cannot be said to have had a 'disparate
impact' on nonwhites.""29
The Court does not want to impose a burden on a business if the
statistical disparities are "innocent," believing that "the inevitable fo-
cus on statistics in disparate impact cases could put undue pressure on
employers to adopt inappropriate prophylactic measures. It is com-
pletely unrealistic to assume that unlawful discrimination is the sole
cause of people failing to gravitate to jobs and employers in accord
with the laws of chance." '294 It would also be "unrealistic to suppose
that employers can eliminate, or discover and explain, the myriad of
innocent causes that may lead to statistical imbalances in the composi-
tion of their work forces. 295
Disparate impact analysis was to obviate the need to establish
intentional discrimination. By bringing in notions of fault, the Court
undermines one of the purposes and attractions of disparate impact
analysis. Suppose that an employer has a pro-nepotism hiring pol-
icy-family members of employees will be given a preference over
others for employment slots which become available. This employer
might use this policy because he wants to discriminate by race but
293. Wards Cove, 490 U.S. at 651-52 (footnote omitted).
294. Watson v. Fort Worth Bank and Trust, 487 U.S. 977, 992 (1988) (citing Sheet Metal
Workers v. EEOC, 478 U.S. 421, 489 (1986) (O'Connor, J., concurring in part and dissent-
ing in part)).
295. Id.
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wants to mask that intention,296 or he might use that policy for more
innocuous reasons, for example, to promote employee loyalty.29
There would be a number of ways to analyze the above pro-nepo-
tism policy. Certainly, it could be viewed as intentionally discrimina-
tory. If the Court, however, requires that a policy be adopted because
of rather than in spite of its adverse effects in order for it to be held
intentionally discriminatory, calling this pro-nepotism hiring policy in-
tentionally discriminatory would be inaccurate.298 Even if there were
not many minority individuals working at this company (and the nep-
otism policy would have a tendency to preserve the disproportionate
status quo), the Court would require more before concluding that the
policy was invidiously discriminatory.299
Depending upon the make-up of the work force, such a nepotism
policy might not pass Title VII requirements. 00 If 25% of those quali-
fied for these jobs in the local workforce were minorities but the firm
workforce was only 3% minority, it is clear that Title VII would have
been violated.30 ' It is not at all clear, however, that even given the
scenario in which the actual workforce was only 3% minority and the
296. See Fiss, supra note 96, at 296 ("For example, if there is an all-white work force,
the employer may use a nepotism criterion because it will produce the same result if he
used race.").
297. Cf. Robert Belton, Causation and Burden-Shifting Doctrines in Employment Dis-
crimination Law Revisited. Some Thoughts on Hopkins and Wards Cove, 64 TUL. L. Rnv.
1359, 1392 (1990) (suggesting that nepotism may be acceptable as a reason for not hiring a
minority whereas customer preferences would not be).
298. According to the Court, the question is not whether a policy could be viewed as
discriminatory but, rather, whether in fact the policy was adopted because of rather than in
spite of its adverse effects. Some commentators do not seem to appreciate this. See Gudel,
supra note 99, at 93 ("An action is discriminatory if it can be interpreted as discriminatory
in light of all the facts and circumstances of the case.").
299. Cf. Fiss, supra note 96, at 267 (discussing a case in which the recruitment pro-
gram-using ads in certain newspapers, word-of-mouth, etc.-is based on costs but
foreseeably disadvantages blacks).
300. See Mark S. Brodin, The Role of Fault and Motive in Defining Discrimination: The
Seniority Question Under Title VII, 62 N.C. L. Rnv. 943, 944 (1984) ("Since 1971, the
Supreme Court has interpreted Title VII to prohibit employment practices that are dis-
criminatory in their effect even if such result is unintended and the employer acted with no
design to discriminate.").
301. Using the percentage of qualified minorities in the relevant workforce as a bench-
mark is not without its critics. If invidious discrimination prevented people from becoming
qualified, they could not be included in the statistics to establish invidious discrimination
and thus the employer would not be justified in implementing a race-conscious program.
See Johnson v. Transportation Agency, 480 U.S. 616, 633 n.10 (1987) (Using this bench-
mark would entail that "employers in precisely those industries in which discrimination has
been most effective would be precluded from adopting training programs to increase the
percentage of qualified minorities.").
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local qualified workforce was 25% minority, this employment policy
would be held invidious and thus constitutionally impermissible.3
0 2
D. Nonfacially Discriminatory Legislation and Equal Protection
A Title VII violation can be established by showing disparate im-
pact.3 3 If there is a significantly higher concentration of qualified mi-
norities in the available workforce than in the company's workforce,
there will be a prima facie Title VII violation. A comparable showing,
without more, however, will not establish a violation of the Equal Pro-
tection Clause.
Sometimes the Court implies that the salient distinction for equal
protection purposes is whether the statutes or policies in question are
facially discriminatory rather than "merely" have a disparate im-
pact.3 1 While disproportionate impact may be an indicator of dis-
criminatory intent-"when a neutral law has a disparate impact upon
a group that has historically been the victim of discrimination, an un-
constitutional purpose may... be at work"305 -the Court nonetheless
follows "the settled rule that the Fourteenth Amendment guarantees
equal laws, not equal results. 30 6
Although the Court refuses to accept that disparate impact, by
itself, establishes (even prima facie) invidious discrimination,3 7 this is
a tempting standard to use. A court using this standard has no need to
inquire into an actor's intention or motivation and instead presumes
302. D. Don Welch, Removing Discriminatory Barriers: Basing Disparate Treatment
Analysis on Motive Rather than Intent, 60 S. CA.. L. REv. 733, 760 (1987) (citing Washing-
ton v. Davis, 426 U.S. 229, 239 (1976)) ("'invidious' discrimination by the federal govern-
ment or a state... must be 'purposeful."').
303. See Wards Cove Packing v. Atonio, 490 U.S. 642, 645-46 (1989) ("A facially neu-
tral employment practice may be deemed violative of Title VII without evidence of the
employer's subjective intent to discriminate .... ").
304. See United States Postal Serv. Bd. of Governors v. Aikens, 460 U.S. 711, 713 n.1
(1983) ("We have consistently distinguished disparate-treatment cases from cases involving
facially neutral employment standards that have disparate impact on minority appli-
cants."); Feeney, 442 U.S. at 260 (A "neutral law does not violate the Equal Protection
Clause solely because it results in a racially disproportionate impact; instead the dispropor-
tionate impact must be traced to a purpose to discriminate on the basis of race."); see also
Arlington Heights, 429 U.S. at 264-65 (citing Washington v. Davis, 426 U.S. 229,242 (1976))
("official action will not be held unconstitutional solely because it results in a racially dis-
proportionate impact.... Proof of racially discriminatory intent or purpose is required to
show a violation of the Equal Protection Clause.").
305. Feeney, 442 U.S. at 273.
306. Id.
307. Washington v. Davis, 426 U.S. 229, 242 (1976) ("Disproportionate impact is not
irrelevant, but it is not the sole touchstone of an invidious racial discrimination forbidden
by the Constitution.").
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the intention. As Justice Stevens explained, "Frequently the most
probative evidence of intent will be objective evidence of what actu-
ally happened rather than evidence describing the subjective state of
mind of the actor. For normally the actor is presumed to have in-
tended the natural consequences of his deeds."3 °8 This point is espe-
cially telling in cases involving government action, "which is
frequently the product of compromise, of collective decisionmaking,
and of mixed motivation. 3 0
9
If disparate impact analysis is rejected, then it may be very diffi-
cult to establish invidious discrimination if the statutes or policies are
not facially discriminatory. 10 In the absence of facial discrimination,
the plaintiff must establish discriminatory intent.311 That burden of
proof is difficult, but not impossible, to meet. "Sometimes a clear pat-
tern, unexplainable on grounds other than race, emerges from the ef-
fect of the state action even when the governing legislation appears
neutral on its face. 31 2 However, "such cases are rare.
313
The Court would claim that it is trying to achieve a difficult bal-
ance. On the one hand, it wants to assure that a "statute, otherwise
neutral on its face, must not be applied so as invidiously to discrimi-
nate on the basis of race.314 On the other hand, all else being equal,
the Court will presume that no invidious intent is involved. In the vast
majority of cases, "impact alone is not determinative, and the Court
must look to other evidence. 315 The Court leaves open the possibil-
ity that discriminatory purpose can be inferred from state action.
"[A]n invidious discriminatory purpose may often be inferred from
the totality of the relevant facts, including the fact, if it is true, that the
law bears more heavily on one race than another. ' 316 If indeed the
impact of a "statute could not be plausibly explained on a neutral
308. Id. at 253 (Stevens, J., concurring).
309. Id.
310. The Court has failed to appreciate the difficulty of establishing invidious discrimi-
nation even where statutes are invidiously discriminatory, given that the discrimination
must be because of rather than in spite of its adverse effects. See supra text accompanying
note 169.
311. Bakke, 438 U.S. at 289 n.27; see also Max J. Schott, Note, Ttle VII Mixed-Motive
Cases: The Eighth Circuit Adds a Second Track of Liability and Remedy, 36 DRAKE L.
Rnv. 155, 162 (1986-87) (If the plaintiff is unable to successfully carry the burden of per-
suasion in establishing pretext, the employer is completely exonerated in terms of
liability.).
312. Arlington Heights, 429 U.S. at 266.
313. Id.
314. Washington v. Davis 426 U.S. 229, 241 (1976).
315. Arlington Heights, 429 U.S. at 266 (footnote omitted).
316. Washington, 426 U.S. at 242.
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ground, impact itself would signal that the real classification made by
the law was in fact not neutral. ' 317 The Court, however, has made
clear that "[j]ust as there are cases in which impact alone can unmask
an invidious classification, there are others, in which-notwithstand-
ing impact-the legitimate noninvidious purposes of a law cannot be
missed."31
If disproportionate impact alone sufficed to establish discrimina-
tory purpose, it would be very difficult to draft nondiscriminatory
legislation.
There is hardly a law on the books that does not affect some
people differently from others. But the basic concern of the
Equal Protection Clause is with state legislation whose purpose
or effect is to create discrete and objectively identifiable classes.
And with respect to such legislation, "it has long been settled
that the Equal Protection Clause is offended only by laws that
are invidiously discriminatory-only by classifications that are2 ,319
wholly arbitrary or capricious.
If the Court had to subject all statutes which either benefited or
burdened one race over another to strict scrutiny, this "would raise
serious questions about, and perhaps invalidate, a whole range of tax,
welfare, public service, regulatory, and licensing statutes ....
Thus it is not difficult to understand why the Court is reluctant to find
a statute or policy invidiously discriminatory absent convincing evi-
dence of illicit intent.
Although the Court realizes that it cannot subject all legislation
which has a disparate impact to strict scrutiny, it has nonetheless
failed to come up with a consistent, fair policy with respect to which
statutes will be strictly scrutinized and which will not. On the one
hand, the Court seems to take seriously that it should be difficult to
establish an intention to discriminate, and that absent evidence of an
intention to discriminate, legislation should be upheld if it promotes a
legitimate purpose. The Court upheld the insurance plans in Geduldig
v. Aiello and General Electric Co. v Gilbert because there was no
"showing that [the] distinctions involving pregnancy [were] mere pre-
317. Feeney, 442 U.S. at 275.
318. Id. (citing Yick Wo v. Hopkins, 118 U.S. 356 (1886)).
319. San Antonio Indep. Sch. Dist. v. Rodriguez, 411 U.S. 1, 60 (1973) (Stewart, J.,
concurring); see also 'Tbssman & ten Broek, supra note 85, at 343 ("It is clear that the
demand for equal protection cannot be a demand that laws apply universally to all persons.
The legislature, if it is to act at all, must impose special burdens upon or grant special
benefits to special groups or classes of individuals.").
320. Washington, 426 U.S. at 248.
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texts designed to effect an invidious discrimination against the mem-
bers of one sex or the other ....
On the other hand, the Court believes that racial classifications
are so pernicious that they can rarely if ever be upheld. It is surprising
that the Court is willing to allow any racial preferential treatment at
all, given the view announced by the Bakke plurality which worried
that "preferential programs may only reinforce common stereotypes
holding that certain groups are unable to achieve success without spe-
cial protection based on a factor having no relationship to individual
worth. '322 Further, even if common stereotypes would not thereby be
promoted, the plurality denied that helping individuals who have been
subject to societal discrimination justifies "a classification that im-
poses disadvantages upon persons.., who bear no responsibility for
whatever harm the beneficiaries of the special admissions program are
thought to have suffered."3' The plurality argued that allowing an
institution to compensate individuals who had not been victimized by
that institution itself "would be to convert a remedy heretofore re-
served for violations of legal rights into a privilege that all institutions
throughout the Nation could grant at their pleasure to whatever
groups are perceived as victims of societal discrimination. 324
This reasoning is instructive. The plurality worries that allowing
people who have allegedly been subjected to discrimination to receive
special benefits would open the door to the allocation of benefits to
undeserving individuals. This is rather misleading, because it is
"plainly true that in our society blacks have suffered discrimination
immeasurably greater than any directed at other racial groups."'
The question is not whether certain minority groups, such as African
Americans, have been subjected to discrimination in this country;3 26
the real question involves whether societal discrimination "alone is
sufficient to justify a racial classification." 327 The Wygant Court re-
jected that criterion and instead required "some showing of prior dis-
321. General Electric Co. v. Gilbert, 429 U.S. 125,134-35 (1976) (discussing Geduldig v.
Aiello, 417 U.S. 484 (1974)).
322. Bakke, 438 U.S. at 298.
323. Id. at 310; see also infra text accompanying notes 371-90 (discussing individual
harm).
324. Bakke, 438 U.S. at 310; but see Frank Askin, The Case for Compensatory Treat-
ment, 24 RuTGE-RS L. Rnv. 65, 70 (1969) (though wholly innocent himself, the white
worker may not reap the benefits of a discriminatory system).
325. Croson, 488 U.S. at 527-28 (Scalia, J., concurring).
326. Wygant, 476 U.S. at 278 n.5 ("[N]o one disputes that there has been race discrimi-
nation in the country.").
327. Id. at 274.
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crimination by the governmental unit involved before allowing limited
use of racial classification in order to remedy such discrimination. ' '328
The Court made an analogous claim in Freeman v. Pitts. "Past wrongs
to the black race, wrongs committed by the State and in its name, are
a stubborn fact of history. And stubborn facts of history linger and
persist."329 Nonetheless, the Court refused to recognize that those
wrongs carried much legal weight, holding that "[b]ut though we can-
not escape our history, neither must we overstate its consequences in
fixing legal responsibilities." 330 The Court suggested that "[w]here
resegregation is a product not of state action but of private choices, it
does not have constitutional implications." 331
The Court argues here that although societal discrimination pro-
vides some reason for a benign discrimination policy, that reason
alone is not good enough. It is only when the state itself has been the
discriminator that the state should act to rectify the situation. Such a
policy minimizes the worth of eradicating invidious discrimination re-
gardless of its source.
It is not open to the Court to argue that it cannot countenance
affirmative action policies because, after all, it has already demon-
strated its commitment to striking down all "arbitrary" policies. The
Court refuses to strike down University admissions policies which are
clearly more arbitrary, for example, which give a preference to the
children of alumni.332
The Court claims that discriminatory purpose is ultimately a
question of fact,333 but it is quite difficult to determine what consti-
328. Itt; see also Feeney, 442 U.S. at 278 (citations omitted) (denying that the State of
Massachusetts had discriminated against women, although admitting that the "enlistment
policies of the Armed Services may well have discriminated on the basis of sex. But the
history of discrimination against women in the military is not on trial in this case.").
329. 112 S. Ct. 1430, 1448 (1992).
330. Id.
331. Id.; see also Board of Educ. of Oklahoma City Public Schools v. Dowell, 498 U.S.
237, 243 (1991) (noting that school district returned to local control because "present resi-
dential segregation was the result of private decisionmaking and economics" rather than
some action taken by the school board itself).
332. See, e.g., Bakke, 438 U.S. at 404 (Blackmun, J., dissenting) ("It is somewhat ironic
to have us so deeply disturbed over a program where race is an element of consciousness,
and yet to be aware of the fact, as we are, that institutions of higher learning... have given
conceded preferences ... to those possessed of athletic skills, to the children of alumni, to
the affluent who may bestow their largess on the institutions and to those having connec-
tions with celebrities, the famous, and the powerful.").
333. United States Postal Serv. Bd. of Governors v. Aikens, 460 U.S. 711, 716 (1983)
("There will seldom be 'eyewitness' testimony as to the employer's mental processes. But
none of this means that trial courts or reviewing courts should treat discrimination differ-
ently from other ultimate questions of fact.").
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tutes a discriminatory purpose. The Court often implies that animus is
required to establish discriminatory purpose but then turns around
and presumes as a matter of law that racial classifications satisfy the
requirements.334 Facially discriminatory statutes will not be deemed
intentional discrimination only if they will be remedying particular-
ized instances of discrimination. 33- A policy which favored minorities
without evidence of past discrimination by that institution may be
struck down as purposefully discriminatory and hence unconstitu-
tional, even though the policy arguably promotes the goals of the
Fourteenth Amendment.336
1. Blame Versus Remedy
When deciding whether remedies are required or even permissi-
ble, the Court concentrates its attention on who did the discriminating
rather than on whether discrimination occurred. This is true whether
the Court is considering the kind of discrimination prohibited by the
Fourteenth Amendment or the kind prohibited by Title VII.
Suppose that a firm had two kinds of employees (management
and factory workers) and that it would hire its managers from within.
Suppose further that the firm admits that it formerly discriminated
against minorities when hiring factory workers and has now adopted
measures to rectify that situation. The firm claims not to have dis-
334. For example, in City of Richmond v. J.A. Croson Co., 488 U.S. 469 (1989), the
Court refused to consider whether the Richmond plan was benignly motivated and sub-
jected it to the same level of scrutiny as would be appropriate for the most maliciously
motivated plan. See id. at 493.
335. See Sullivan, supra note 1, at 1612 ("Croson culminated the Court's long-mounting
trend toward limiting the justification for affirmative action to a narrow brand of corrective
justice: remedying particularized past discrimination.").
336. See Robert M. O'Neil, Racial Preference and Higher Education: The Larger Con-
text, 60 VA. L. Rav. 925, 932 (1974) (arguing that "any classification which furthers or
serves the goals of the Fourteenth Amendment is not invidious"); Sandalow, supra note
208, at 665-66 ("But if it is undesirable to be governed by the past, it is worse to be ruled by
a misconception of the past. And only a misconception of the past leads to the conclusion
that it imposes upon government an obligation of 'colorblindness."'); Eric Schnapper, Af-
firmative Action and the Legislative History of the Fourteenth Amendment, 71 U. VA. L.
Rav. 753 (1985) (affirmative action is in accord with intentions of Framers of the Four-
teenth Amendment because special benefits were set aside for blacks); but see Greenawalt,
supra note 8, at 571 ("Even benign classifications are in obvious tension with Fourteenth
Amendment values, since benign classifications have some malign results."); Lavinsky,
supra note 58, at 527 ("The argument that a racial classification which discriminates against
white people is not inherently suspect implies that the white majority is monolithic and so
politically powerful as not to require the constitutional safeguards afforded minority racial
groups."); Cf. Adelman, supra note 210, at 413-14 (suggesting that some believe Equal
Protection Clause color-blind; others that it is color conscious, merely barring invidious
discrimination but allowing benign discrimination such as affirmative action).
criminated when considering promotions and thus argues that it
should not be forced to adopt an affirmative action policy with respect
to management positions. The Court would quickly point out that
"[d]iscrimination at the entry level necessarily precluded blacks from
competing for promotions, and resulted in a departmental hierarchy
dominated exclusively by nonminorities."337
Suppose that the situation is somewhat different. This time, there
are two firms. Firm D clearly discriminates against minorities. Firm
ND hires its employees from Firm D, because that is the only place
where individuals can get the requisite training. ND has no desire to
discriminate against minorities-it would like to hire more but has
found that there are no qualified minority employees in the area. It
seems clear that the Court would not require ND to implement an
affirmative action program.
Suppose, however, that ND believes the current situation so in-
tolerable that it voluntarily decides to adopt an explicitly race-con-
scious program to ameliorate the situation. The Court's reasoning
implies that ND should be prohibited from voluntarily implementing a
program to remedy the effects of D's invidious discrimination.338
Here, it would not be as if the Court were striking down a law which
required employers to adopt affirmative action policies even if those
employers had not discriminated in the past. Rather, it would be as if
the Court were striking down a law which permitted employers to
adopt race-conscious affirmative action policies to help remedy some
of the discrimination which clearly had occurred in the past and was
still occurring.
Some commentators suggest that the Court's position is mud-
dled.339 It would be difficult to disagree with that assessment,
although it would be unfair to imply that only the Court is confused.
For example, some commentators imply that affirmative action poli-
cies are invidious because of the bad effects which might result.340
337. United States v. Paradise, 480 U.S. 149, 168 (1987).
338. Because Title VII applies to private as well as public employers, there is no state
action requirement at issue here.
339. Cf Ely, supra note 143, at 1211-12. ("The Court should stop pretending it does not
remember opinions on which the ink is barely dry and try to formulate principles for decid-
ing on what occasions and in what ways the motivation of legislators or other government
officials is relevant to constitutional issues.").
340. See Greenawalt, supra note 8, at 571 (Benefits to groups fosters racial politics and
perpetuates thinking in racial terms.); John Kaplan, Equal Treatment in an Unequal World:
Equality for the Negro-The Problem of Special Treatment, 61 Nw. U. L. Rnv. 363, 375
(1966) (attempts to secure preferential employment for blacks will be very divisive); id. at
379 (any legal classification by race weakens the government as an education force). But
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Certainly, we might look at the bad effects to help determine whether
the legislation had in fact been motivated by animus341 or, perhaps, a
devaluing of the dignity and worth of the affected class.3 42 However,
this involves looking at effects as an indicator of motivation. It does
not involve seeing whether the effects are negative and, if so, there-
fore concluding that invidious discrimination is taking place. Thus,
even were it true that affirmative action had some net effects, that
would not establish its invidiousness.
The Court has made clear that while negative effects should be
avoided, their existence does not establish the presence of invidious
motivation. 43 Ironically, the only (unstated) exception to the Court's
explicit rule that negative effects do not establish invidiousness seems
to be where affirmative action policies are at issue.
The current Court seems to believe that any negative effects pro-
duced by a race-conscious policy supply the requisite predicate to es-
tablish that the policy is invidiously discriminatory, ignoring the
Court's previous claim that a policy must be adopted because of,
rather than in spite of, its negative effects in order to be held invidi-
ously discriminatory. This new policy, in effect, precludes any at-
tempts to remedy directly past discrimination, because it is plausible
that any race-conscious program will have some negative effects.
Even in a case in which the particular person who had suffered invidi-
ous discrimination was compensated, there would be some resent-
ment.3" Indeed, one would not have to extend the Court's articulated
position much further to argue that even identified victims of invidi-
ous racial discrimination should not be compensated. Many individu-
als are denied employment for arbitrary reasons and allowing
see O'Neil supra note 336, at 940 (arguing that our society cannot be completely colorblind
in the short term if we are to have a colorblind society in the long term).
341. Simon, supra note 143, at 1058 (noting that cases may be difficult if they involve
so-called benign classifications in which an inquiry into whether an action harms the group
purportedly helped is an important part of evidentiary process through which we deter-
mine which is prejudiced).
342. See Clark, supra note 187, at 966-67 ("[I]nvidious motivation or invidious purpose
consists of devaluing needs, wants, capabilities, or dignity of members of a group, whether
for reasons of hostility or of other prejudice, on the unwarranted assumption that such
members are less capable or less worthy of consideration than other members of society.").
343. For example, the negative effects produced by Texas' decision to reduce welfare
benefits did not establish the presence of invidious motivation. See Jefferson v. Hackney,
406 U.S. 535 (1972).
344. See Rosenfeld, supra note 205, at 902 (noting that whether preferential treatment
is granted to a victim of actual past discrimination or whether it is accorded to distribute a
given percentage of available jobs to members of underrepresented class, effect on inno-
cent non-minority member losing seniority rights is likely the same).
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arbitrary rejection because of race to be compensable but the arbi-
trary rejection on other grounds not to be compensable will (alleg-
edly) promote the Nation's thinking in racial terms.
The Court has held that illicit motivation, without more, will not
establish that a statute or policy is unconstitutional. In addition,
harmful effects must be likely to result. Further, the Court imposes a
but-for condition. Thus, a statute or policy should not be struck down
unless it can be established that without the discriminatory intent the
policy or statute would not have been passed.345 It seems underap-
preciated how the Court's holdings in discrimination cases where af-
firmative action is not at issue play out in cases in which affirmative
action is at issue.
For example, it would be difficult to establish animus if a predom-
inately white City Council passed an affirmative action policy, because
it is not likely that the group would have a racial animus towards
whites.34 In most cases, in order to establish animus, the Court will
have to presume it despite the facts; the Court members will have to
choose to "close [their] eyes to the facts in favor of the theory. 347
Even were the Council controlled by blacks, there would be no reason
(without more) to infer antipathy, given all the possible justifications
for an affirmative action policy.348 Indeed, there is some reason to
believe that minority groups in power might disadvantage
minorities.349
345. See Simon, supra note 143, at 1065 (the determinative issue in a racial equal pro-
tection suit is whether the challenged action would not have been taken but for racial
prejudice).
346. See United Jewish Org. of Williamsburgh, Inc. v. Carey, 430 U.S. 144, 178 (1977)
(Brennan, J., concurring in part) (The "obvious remedial nature of the Act and its enact-
ment by an elected Congress that... [cannot] be viewed as dominated by nonwhite repre-
sentatives belie the possibility that the decisionmaker intended a racial insult or injury to
those whites ... adversely affected by the operation of the Act's provisions."); Simon,
supra note 143, at 1108 (noting that when the proportionate disadvantage is instead suf-
fered by the majority white group, an inference of anti-white prejudice will ordinarily not
be warranted without very substantial additional evidence, given the improbability of this
group's taking prejudicial actions against itself).
347. Wright v. Council of Emporia, 407 U.S. 451, 472 (1972) (Burger, J., dissenting).
348. Sullivan, supra note 1, at 1617 (suggesting that the Croson plurality view implied
that "the representative process could not be trusted to protect white interests when a
black faction had come to power").
349. See Castaneda v. Partida, 430 U.S. 482, 503 (1977) (Marshall, J., concurring) (foot-
note omitted) ("Social scientists agree that members of minority groups frequently re-
spond to discrimination and prejudice by attempting to disassociate themselves from the
group, even to the point of adopting the majority's negative attitudes toward the
minority.").
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Suppose that the Court was willing to infer an invidious motiva-
tion when a black-controlled City Council adopted an affirmative ac-
tion policy, as the plurality did in Croson.35 0 Even so, the but-for
clause adds another condition, namely, that there must be good rea-
son to believe that without that animus the Council would not have
passed the policy. Because there are a variety of noninvidious reasons
to adopt an affirmative action policy, the but-for condition would
seem particularly difficult to satisfy.35 '
The Court's current Title VII jurisprudence and, even more
starkly, its invidious discrimination jurisprudence, reflect a change in
emphasis regarding which innocents must be protected, where those
innocents include minorities who have suffered discrimination, nonmi-
nority workers who might not now receive a benefit which they other-
wise would have received had their employer not adopted a race-
conscious policy, and employers whose policies (which have a dispa-
rate impact) are related to legitimate business concerns. Twenty years
ago, the Court's concern was to compensate innocent minorities who
had suffered discrimination. In Griggs v. Duke Power Co.,352 the
Court was concerned that childhood deficiencies in the education and
background of minority citizens, resulting from forces beyond their
control, not be allowed to work a cumulative and invidious burden on
such citizens for the remainder of their lives. 3  Now the Court seems
350. Croson, 488 U.S. at 524 (Scalia. J., concurring in the judgment). Justice Scalia
noted
The prophecy of these words came to fruition in Richmond in the enactment
of a set-aside clearly and directly beneficial to the dominant political group, which
happens also to be the dominate group. The same thing has no doubt happened
before in other cities (though the racial basis of the preference has rarely been
made textually explicit)-and blacks have often been on the receiving end of the
injustice. Where injustice is the game, however, turnabout is not fair play.
But see id. at 55 (Marshall, J., dissenting). Justice Marshall noted
The majority's view that remedial measures undertaken by municipalities with
black leadership must face a stiffer test of Equal Protection Clause scrutiny than
remedial measures undertaken by municipalities with white leadership implies a
lack of political maturity on the part of this Nation's elected minority officials that
is totally unwarranted. Such insulting judgments have no place in constitutional
jurisprudence.
Id.
351. See Henkin, supra note 82, at 489 (arguing that justifications for preferential treat-
ment in education, for example, include: (a) compensation for past and presentation dis-
crimination, (b) raising self-respect and providing role models, (c) compensation for
individual past wrongs, (d) providing more black lawyers to benefit community and society
as a whole, (e) enriching all learning experiences).
352. 401 U.S. 424 (1971).
353. Id. at 431.
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more concerned about assuring that innocent nonminority workers or
employers are free from "punishment."
It is difficult to explain from the language or history of Title VII
why the Court believes "the statute compels race-conscious remedies
where a recipient institution has engaged in past discrimination but
prohibits such remedial action where racial minorities, as a result of
the effects of past discrimination imposed by entities other than the
recipient, [have been] excluded .... ,154 Nonetheless, that seems to be
the current Court's view. As long as "a challenged practice serves, in
a significant way, the legitimate employment goals of the em-
ployer, '355 the Court will not impose burdens on the employer. Even
if an employer could set up the workplace differently to achieve the
same output with a more integrated workforce,356 the Court will not
require the employer to do so.
2. Morton and Preferential Hiring
Ironically, the Court is sometimes willing to uphold preferential
hiring even absent a showing of animus or intentional discrimination.
The Court, in Morton v. Mancari,3 57 upheld preferential hiring in the
Bureau of Indian Affairs, even though there had been no showing of
wrongdoing. The Court justified its position by pointing out that a
policy of preferential hiring would promote a variety of worthwhile
goals. "One of the primary means by which self-government would be
fostered and the Bureau made more responsive was to increase the
participation of tribal Indians in the BIA operations." '35 The Court
recognized that Native Americans would be at a disadvantage were
they not given a preference. "In actual practice there has been no
adequate program of training to qualify Indians to compete in these
examinations, especially for technical and higher positions ....
The point here is not that this policy is somehow inappropriate, but
that it seems contrary to most of the policies which the Court has set
out.
As Justice Kennedy said, "The history of governmental reliance
on race demonstrates that racial policies defended as benign often are
354. Bakke, 438 U.S. at 344 (Brennan, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part).
355. Wards Cove, 490 U.S. at 659.
356. See generally Mark Kelman, Concepts of Discrimination in "General Ability" Job
Testing, 104 HARV. L. REv. 1157 (1991) (suggesting that altering the workplace might be
an appropriate requirement).
357. 417 U.S. 535 (1974).
358. Id. at 543 (footnote omitted).
359. Id- at 544 (quoting 78 Cong.Rec. 11729 (1934)).
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not seen that way by the individuals affected by them."360 People who
were not able to secure employment in the Bureau of Indian Affairs
because of the preferential hiring might not have seen the preferential
hiring as benign. The Court is guilty of two offenses with respect to its
reliance on individual perceptions: it takes judicial cognizance of re-
sentment even if that resentment is not justified, and it has no consis-
tent policy with respect to when innocent parties' feelings of
resentment will be given weight.
The Court understood that upholding preferential hiring in the
BIA might seem to set a precedent for racial affirmative action else-
where, and tried very hard to prevent this. The Court denied that this
was a racial preference at all, both because this was not a racial group
and because the objective was not intentional racial discrimination.
To establish that this was not a racial group, the Court wrote, "The
preference is not directed towards a 'racial' group consisting of 'Indi-
ans'; instead, it applies only to members of 'federally recognized'
tribes." '361 The Court concluded that because the classification "oper-
ates to exclude many individuals who are racially to be classified as
'Indians', ... the preference is political rather than racial in nature. '362
If the Court can hold that a statute does not discriminate against
women because only some women will need pregnancy benefits, then
the Court can hold that a statute does not favor Native Americans
because only some Native Americans will be benefitted. To the extent
that the former claim seems specious, however, so does the latter. For
example, affirmative action programs are not designed for all minori-
ties, but only for those who are qualified (or would be qualified with
the relevant training) for the position,363 who are old enough to work
but are not past retirement age, etc. Using the Court's own reasoning,
it would seem that affirmative action programs are political rather
than racial because they "exclude many individuals who are racially to
be classified as [minorities]." 364
Consider an employer who, adopting the Court's reasoning, de-
nied that its policy of excluding minorities was invidiously discrimina-
tory because the policy only affected certain African Americans-
qualified ones. The others would be rejected on the ground that they
360. Metro Broadcasting, 497 U.S. at 635 (Kennedy, J., dissenting).
361. Morton, 417 U.S. at 553 n.24.
362. Id.
363. See Fullilove, 448 U.S. at 521 (Marshall, J., concurring in the judgment) ("[U]nder
the set-aside provision a contract may be awarded to a minority enterprise only if it is
qualified to do the work.").
364. Morton, 417 U.S. at 553 n.24.
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were not qualified for the job. The Court would reject this claim out
of hand. Yet, such a claim seems no more specious than that a policy
does not discriminate against women because it only disadvantages
pregnant women or that a policy does not involve a racial preference
because it only benefits members of federally recognized tribes.
To establish in Morton that the government was not using a racial
preference even if one accepted that the target group was a racial
group, the Court denied that the preference involved racial discrimi-
nation or "even a 'racial' preference. Rather, it [was] an employment
criterion reasonably designed to further the cause of Indian self-gov-
ernment and to make the BIA more responsive to the needs of its
constituent groups." '65 A corporation which adopted an affirmative
action program, however, might deny that it was employing a racial
preference and might instead claim to be promoting good public rela-
tions, perhaps by promoting its image of being a good corporate citi-
zen or by giving something back to a community which was a large
consumer of its products or services.
The Court made clear its real reason for upholding the preference
in Morton, namely, that it was only in the BIA.
The preference does not cover any other Government agency or
activity, and we need not consider the obviously more difficult
question that would be presented by a blanket exemption for
Indians from all civil service examinations. Here, "the prefer-
ence is reasonably and directly related to a legitimate
nonracially based goal. This is the principal characteristic that
generally is absent from proscribed forms of racial
discrimination." '66
The court is implicitly arguing that the issue is not whether there
is animus against a particular group or even a facial intention to dis-
criminate. The question, rather, is how much integration will we have.
The Court apparently believes that we already have enough (con-
scious) integration and that any further steps to achieve integration of
the sexes and races must occur "naturally." 67
365. Id. at 553-54 (footnote omitted).
366. Id. at 554.
367. One might have difficulty distinguishing the positions of the Plessy Court and the
current Court. Compare Plessy v. Ferguson, 163 U.S. 537, 551 (1896) (The argument...
assumes that social prejudices may be overcome by legislation, and that equal rights cannot
be secured to the negro except by an enforced commingling of the two races. We cannot
accept this proposition. If the two races are to meet upon terms of social equality, it must
be the result of natural affinities, a mutual appreciation of each other's merits, and a volun-
tary consent of individuals.") and Pitts, 112 S. Ct. at 1448 ("[W]here resegregation is a
product not of state actions but of private choices, it does not have constitutional implica-
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E. Individual Harm
The Court sometimes views racial discrimination as if it were sim-
ply a matter of individual harm,368 accepting Justice Scalia's reasoning
that the "relevant proposition is not that it was blacks, or Jews, or
Irish who were discriminated against, but that it was individual men
and women, 'created equal,' who were discriminated against. And the
relevant resolve is that that should never happen again. ' 369 Justice
O'Connor has said that the "right to equal protection of the laws is a
personal right, securing to each individual an immunity from treat-
ment predicated simply on membership in a particular racial or ethnic
group. '370 In Croson, the plurality rejected a Richmond set-aside pro-
gram because it denied "certain citizens the opportunity to compete
for a fixed percentage of public contracts based solely upon their
race." 371 The plurality held that regardless of the racial group to
which the affected individuals belong, "their 'personal rights' to be
treated with equal dignity and respect are implicated by a rigid rule
erecting race as the sole criterion in an aspect of public
decisionmaking. ' 372
The current Court views affirmative action with a jaundiced eye
when the institution itself has not been shown to have discrimi-
nated,373 or when competitive benefits are being given to minority in-
dividuals who cannot establish that they themselves were victimized
by the institution's discriminatory practices.374 The Court overlooks
important issues, however, when it equates benign and malicious dis-
crimination. For example, the Bakke plurality wrote, "When a classi-
fication denies an individual opportunities or benefits enjoyed by
others solely because of his race or ethnic background, it must be re-
garded as suspect. '375 Affirmative action proponents do not claim,
however, that an individual should be burdened solely because of her
tions. It is beyond the authority and beyond the practical ability of the federal courts to try
to counteract these kinds of continuous and massive demographic shifts.").
368. Cf. Brest, supra note 176, at 39 ("[Rfiring quotas and the protection of recently
hired minority workers against layoffs under the 'last hired, first fired' rule are indifferent
to whether the preferred individuals were victims of the employer's discrimination and
thus present more difficult issues of fairness.").
369. Croson, 488 U.S. at 528 (Scalia, J., concurring).
370. Metro Broadcasting, 497 U.S. at 609 (O'Connor, J., dissenting) (citing Shelley v.
Kraemer, 334 U.S. 1 (1948)).
371. Croson, 488 U.S. at 493.
372. Id.
373. See Croson, 488 U.S. at 485.
374. See Firefighters Local Union No. 1784 v. Stotts, 467 U.S. 561, 579-80 (1984).
375. Bakke, 438 U.S. at 305.
race. The Court's equating benign and malicious discrimination actu-
ally reformulates the relevant issue. While the claim that people
should not be punished solely because of their race is correct, it has
relevance to so few cases in the context of benign discrimination that
its very utterance is misleading. Affirmative action programs are
designed to promote a number of legitimate goals. They are not
designed to punish or burden individuals solely because of their race.
As Justice Blackmun explained, the purpose of affirmative action
"is not to make whole any particular individual, but rather to remedy
the present class-wide effects of past discrimination or to prevent simi-
lar discrimination in the future.... [S]uch relief is provided to the
class as a whole rather than to its individual members." '376 Where
there is a showing of past discrimination, the people who benefit from
an affirmative action policy need not be those who were specifically
victimized.3 7 7 The Court has recognized that "in order to remedy the
effects of prior discrimination, it may be necessary to take race into
account. As part of this Nation's dedication to eradicating racial dis-
crimination, innocent persons may be called upon to bear some of the
burden of the remedy. 378
The question then becomes how much of a burden an individual
may be asked to bear in order for society to remedy the effects of past
discrimination. One might distinguish between hires and layoffs, for
example, because "denial of a future employment opportunity is not
as intrusive as loss of an existing job."379 The distinctions become less
easy to draw when one considers related areas, like promotion and
seniority. On the one hand, a denial of a promotion might not unset-
tle any "legitimate, firmly rooted expectation[s]. '380 The Court has
also held that "employee expectations arising from a seniority system
agreement may be modified by statutes furthering a strong public pol-
icy interest."'3 81
On the other hand, such a policy may foster resentment. In a
particular case where "[n]one of the racially preferred blacks ... was
376. Firefighters Local Union No. 1784 v. Stotts, 467 U.S. 561, 613 (1984) (Blackmun,
J., dissenting).
377. Local Number 93, Int'l Assoc. of Firefighters v. City of Cleveland, 478 U.S. 501,
516 (1986) ("It is ... clear that the voluntary action available to employers and unions
seeking to eradicate race discrimination may include reasonable race-conscious relief that
benefits individuals who were not actual victims of discrimination.").
378. Wygant, 476 U.S. at 280-81.
379. Id. at 282-83. But see id. at 296 (Marshall, J., dissenting) ("[L]ayoffs are unfair.
But unfairness ought not be confused with constitutional injury.").
380. Johnson v. Transportation Agency, 480 U.S. 616, 638 (1987).
381. Franks v. Bowman Transp. Co., Inc., 424 U.S. 747, 778 (1976).
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shown to have been a victim of discriminatory promotion practices;
and none of the whites denied promotion was shown to have been
responsible or in any way implicated in the discriminatory practices
recited in the decree," 382 the white individuals who were denied pro-
motion might be quite dissatisfied.
If this situation arose today, the Court would probably offer the
following analysis:
All state-imposed classifications that rearrange burdens and
benefits on the basis of race are likely to be viewed with deep
resentment by the individuals burdened. The denial to innocent
persons of equal rights and opportunities may outrage those so
deprived and therefore may be perceived as invidious. These
individuals are likely to find little comfort in the notion that the
deprivation they are asked to endure is merely the price of
membership in the dominant majority and that its imposition is
inspired by the supposedly benign purpose of aiding others.
One should not lightly dismiss the inherent unfairness of, and
the perception of mistreatment that accompanies, a system of
allocating benefits and privileges on the basis of skin color and
ethnic origin.38 3
While such an analysis might be initially appealing, its attractive-
ness disappears upon further reflection. In affirmative action cases,
benefits are not being allocated because of an arbitrary preference for
one race over another. This allocation is instead made because of a
previous arbitrary racial preference, either by the institution itself or
by society at large. While an arbitrary racial preference system may
be inherently unfair, a compensatory system is not. The relevant
question is not whether a system will be resented, but whether it
should be resented.
There is another difficulty with the current application of the
analysis, namely, that the Court would not be giving adequate weight
to how minorities would react to the state's failure to "rearrange bur-
dens and benefits."384 They would likely find "little comfort in the
notion that the deprivations they [were] asked to [continue to] endure
[were] merely the price of membership"38 5 in a minority in a society
which had historically subjected them to discrimination. A system
382. Local Number 93, Int'l Assoc. of Firefighters v. City of Cleveland, 478 U.S. 501,
535 (1986) (White, J., dissenting).
383. See Bakke, 438 U.S. at 294 n.34.
384. Id.
385. Id.
which not only does not eradicate discrimination but which prohibits
others from attempting to do so is inherently unfair.386
Suppose that resentment does occur when race-conscious systems
are used. This does not mean that the appropriate object of resent-
ment is the individual who is a member of the group against whom the
employer or society has discriminated. For instance, when an individ-
ual tortfeasor is forced to pay civil damages to another party, innocent
members of the tortfeasor's family may feel some resentment because
they will not be able to live as well as they otherwise would have.
Even if it is appropriate for those family members to feel some resent-
ment (they may be completely innocent and may not have benefitted
at all from the tort), the resentment should be directed toward the
tortfeasor rather than the victim. The argument here is not that the
family members should feel no resentment-as if they somehow were
responsible for the tortfeasor's action-but merely that they should
resent the tortfeasor rather than the victim or her family or her
friends.
Basically, the current Court believes that all laws should be race-
blind except in very narrowly defined circumstances. Perhaps this
would be a sensible policy were one designing a new society-the
state might decide not to incorporate racial classifications in its laws
and might decide not to allow others to incorporate such classifica-
tions in their policies. The wisdom of such a policy would depend on a
variety of factors. For example, even in a new such society, if individ-
uals resorted to subtle, invidious discrimination, it might be necessary
for the state to make race-conscious classifications to counteract these
invidious practices.
In any case the court cannot pretend this is a new country with no
history. Given the history of discrimination and racial tension in this
country, it is an empirical question whether allowing race-conscious
measures will escalate rather than de-escalate racial tensions and hos-
tilities. It is at least as likely, if not more likely, that the Court's re-
fusal to allow race-conscious affirmative action policies will increase
rather than decrease racial division and animosity.
Given our history, it would seem that the most direct method to
rectify past injustice would be to allow reverse discrimination. By
prohibiting race-conscious measures, the Court forces institutions to
adopt indirect means to compensate for past injustice. 8 7 Not only is
386. See IM.
387. See Croson, 488 U.S. at 528 (Scalia, J., concurring) (since blacks have been dispro-
portionately disadvantaged by racial discrimination, only a race-neutral remedial program
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the adoption of indirect methods inefficient, but the use of such meth-
ods will be very tempting for courts to strike down precisely because
they are inefficient and precisely because they are not sufficiently nar-
rowly tailored to achieve the state's purposes. In what seemed to ap-
proach the height of disingenuousness, the city of Richmond was
criticized by members of the Croson Court for adopting a measure
which was both too narrowly tailored and, in the same respect, not
sufficiently narrowly tailored. 8
The Bakke plurality wrote, "If it is the individual who is entitled
to judicial protection against classifications based upon his racial or
ethnic background because such distinctions impinge upon personal
rights, rather than the individual only because of his membership in a
particular group, then constitutional standards may be applied consist-
ently. ' 38 9 Yet if the status quo must be maintained unless the particu-
lar individual harmed is herself found and compensated, there will be
little deterrent to continuing invidiously discriminatory practices, es-
pecially given the possible difficulties in proving invidious racial
discrimination.390
H1. The Court's Implicit View
The most surprising aspect of the Court's position is what it is
saying implicitly. The Court seems to have rejected its own invidious
discrimination jurisprudence when analyzing whether intentional ra-
cial discrimination is invidious. It is unlikely that most race-conscious
policies which are even plausibly thought benign were designed be-
aimed at the disadvantaged as such will have a disproportionately beneficial impact on
blacks. Only such a program, and not one that operates on the basis of race, is in accord
with the letter and the spirit of our Constitution).
388. The Croson plurality noted "There is absolutely no evidence of past discrimination
against Spanish-speaking, Oriental, Indian, Eskimo, or Aleut persons in any aspect of the
Richmond construction industry," implying that the classification was not sufficiently nar-
rowly drawn. Croson, 488 U.S. at 506. Justice Scalia implied that the classification was too
narrowly drawn, because it was (allegedly) obviously intended to benefit blacks at the ex-
pense of whites.
Racial preferences appear to "even the score" (in some small degree) only if one
embraces the proposition that our society is appropriately viewed as divided into
races, making it right that an injustice rendered in the past to a black man should
be compensated for by discriminating against a white. Nothing is worth that
embrace.
Id. at 528 (Scalia, J., concurring).
389. Bakke, 438 U.S. at 299.
390. Cf. Griggs v. Duke Power Co., 401 U.S. 424,430 (1971) ("Under the Act, practices,
procedures, or tests neutral on their face, and even neutral in terms of intent, cannot be
maintained if they operate to 'freeze' the status quo of prior discriminatory employment
practices.").
cause they would disadvantage certain groups. If intentional discrimi-
nation must be "selected or reaffirmed... at least in part 'because of,'
not merely 'in spite of,' its adverse effects upon an identifiable
group," 91 then it is not even clear that benign discrimination policies
are appropriately viewed as intentionally discriminatory, much less as
prompted by malice. Insofar as animus is the feature which makes
intentionally discriminatory practices constitutionally offensive, it
seems absurd to strike most benign discrimination programs as
unconstitutional.
It might be argued that the Court must impose strict scrutiny
when examining any racial classifications, because otherwise the
Court would be forced to examine such statutes in light of the rational
basis test and uphold any statute which promotes any legitimate goal.
The Court might examine such statutes or policies with heightened
rather than strict scrutiny. The Bakke minority recognized that there
is a "significant risk that racial classifications established for ostensibly
benign purposes can be misused, causing effects not unlike those cre-
ated by invidious classifications, ' 92 concluding that it was "inappro-
priate to inquire only whether there is any conceivable basis that
might sustain such a classification. Instead to justify such a classifica-
tion an important and articulated purpose for its use must be
shown."3 93 Or the Court might impose strict scrutiny, but limit the
content of that scrutiny to determining whether animus had in fact
motivated passage of the bill or adoption of the policy.
394
When the Court explains why it finds affirmative action programs
constitutionally infirm, it tends to emphasize the potential negative
effects of the institution of such programs. Justice O'Connor said,
"The dangers of such classifications are clear. They endorse race-
based reasoning and the conception of a Nation divided into racial
blocs, thus contributing to an escalation of racial hostility and con-
flict."'395 The Croson plurality said, "Classifications based on race
carry a danger of stigmatic harm. Unless they are strictly reserved for
remedial settings, they may in fact promote notions of racial inferi-
391. Feeney, 442 U.S. at 279 (citation and footnote omitted).
392. Bakke, 438 U.S. at 361.
393. Id. Thus, the Court would not accept at face value an assertion that a particular
policy was benign. The policy or statute would be examined closely to assure that it was
indeed credibly classified as benign.
394. Bakke, 438 U.S. at 361-62 (Brennan, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part)
(footnote omitted).
395. Metro Broadcasting, 497 U.S. at 603 (O'Connor, J., dissenting).
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ority and lead to a politics of racial hostility."39 Even the Bakke mi-
nority warned, "State programs designed ostensibly to ameliorate the
effects of past racial discrimination obviously create the same hazard
of stigma, since they may promote racial separatism and reinforce the
views of those who believe that members of racial minorities are in-
herently incapable of succeeding on their own. '397 Indeed, a whole
host of dangers may be promoted by the government's countenancing
benign discrimination. "Government recognition and sanction of ra-
cial classifications may be inherently divisive, reinforcing prejudices,
confirming perceived differences between the races, and weakening
the government's educative role on behalf of equality and
neutrality."3 98
The difficulty here is not that an absurd analysis is being of-
fered-it may be that benign discrimination programs will have these
effects. The difficulty is that the Court refuses to consider whether
striking down benign discrimination programs will have an even worse
effect. It is at best unclear whether racial harmony and acceptance
would be better promoted by the presence rather than by the absence
of race-conscious programs. In any case, the Court's likening benign
discrimination programs to the kinds of policies and statutes that were
once common in this country does not inspire confidence in the
Court's reasoning or impartiality. The Court refuses to take to heart
Justice Marshall's point that "profound difference[s] separate ... gov-
ernmental actions that themselves are racist, and governmental ac-
tions that seek to remedy the effects of prior racism or to prevent
neutral governmental activity from perpetuating the effects of such
racism. '399 By lumping all of these practices together, the Court im-
plies that they are all on the same moral level. By reinforcing that
view, the Court may actually be unintentionally lending support to
racist views, enhancing both their credibility and acceptability.
A legislature which adopts affirmative action guidelines might
have any of a number of legitimate goals: rectifying past discrimina-
tion, assuring that there are role models within particular professions,
396. Croson, 488 U.S. at 493. See also Metro Broadcasting, 497 U.S. at 604 (O'Connor,
J., dissenting) ("Racial classifications, whether providing benefits to or burdening particu-
lar racial or ethnic groups, may stigmatize those groups singled out for different treatment
and may create considerable tension with the Nation's widely shared commitment to evalu-
ating individuals upon their individual merit.").
397. Bakke, 438 U.S. at 360 (Brennan, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part).
398. Associated Gen. Contractors of Mass., Inc. v. Altshuler, 490 F.2d 9, 17 (1st Cir.
1973).
399. Croson, 488 U.S. at 551-52 (Marshall, J., dissenting).
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etc. None of these involve an attempt to impose a stigma or assert the
inferiority of the disadvantaged group. A legislature which adopts dis-
criminatory measures against a minority is presumably trying to im-
pose a stigma or assert the dominant group's superiority. While the
former group of goals is quite compatible with (and indeed supports)
the ideals reflected in the Fourteenth Amendment, the latter set is
incompatible with those goals. By equating these two practices, the
court obfuscates an important difference between them.
It is an empirical question whether benign discrimination policies
will reinforce rather than destroy prejudice. It is surprising that the
Court would hold those policies unconstitutional on the basis of pre-
dictions which societal scientists could not confidently make. It may
be that the Court is not holding that such policies are unconstitutional
because of a finding that they will in fact promote harm than good,
but instead because of the very possibility that they might have the
effects described above. Because the Court's holding these policies
unconstitutional might itself have these very negative effects, how-
ever, it seems ironic that the Court would not subject its own policies
and actions to the standard it uses for the policies of others.
If the Court is going to strike down affirmative action policies or
statutes because of the fear that they will be perceived as pernicious,
then the Court should manifest equal concern about other kinds of
policies and statutes which may also be perceived as pernicious. Hav-
ing a presumption of animus in affirmative action cases and a pre-
sumption of no animus in disparate impact cases seriously weakens
the Court's appearance of impartiality.
When a university or governmental agency tries to impose a be-
nign discrimination program, it does not seek to deprive someone of
benefits solely because of race or ethnic background. It seeks to rem-
edy past discrimination, among other goals.4 °° The Court recognizes
that the "State certainly has a legitimate and substantial interest in
ameliorating, or eliminating where feasible, the disabling effects of
identified discrimination."'" By implying that benign discrimination
programs burden individuals solely because of race, the Court belies
400. See Brest, supra note 176, at 31 ("Past and remote discrimination often manifest
themselves in racially disproportionate impact, and the antidiscrimination principle may
therefore support its amelioration or elimination.").
401. Bakke, 438 U.S. 265, 307. See also Croson, 488 U.S. at 552 (Marshall, J., dissent-
ing) ("racial classifications drawn for the purpose of remedying the effects of discrimina-
tion that itself was race-based have a highly pertinent basis: the tragic and indelible fact
that discrimination against blacks and other racial minorities in this Nation has pervaded
our Nation's history and continues to sear our society.").
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its own admission that one of the goals of such programs is to remedy
past discrimination.
The Court admits that there has been identified discrimination-
that blacks specifically have been the victim of past discrimination.
The Court nonetheless insists that the specific discriminator be identi-
fied, as if benign discrimination were a sort of punishment to be im-
posed on a guilty party. By adopting this view, the Court promotes
the view that integration is an undesirable burden which will only be
placed on individuals who flout the law. By suggesting that resegrega-
tion that "is a product not of state action but of private choices...
does not have constitutional implications," 4" the Court implies that
although it will not allow the state to officially promote racial separa-
tion, it will protect those private actors who do so on their own. The
Court seems to believe that "residential segregation [which is] the re-
sult of private decisionmaking and economics' 3 is beyond the scope
of appropriate state influence.4 °4
In the past several years, the Court has made it harder to show
that .institutions are discriminating against minorities and also harder
for institutions to adopt affirmative action policies. The implicit
message is that the Court is losing its resolve to promote integration
and equality. The implicit view in Dowell and Pitts that while state-
sponsored intentional discrimination is prohibited private intentional
discrimination is understandable and must be permitted 4 5 further
demonstrates the Court's change in position. While the Court is cor-
rect in holding that state-sponsored intentional discrimination is worse
than private intentional discrimination, the Court is incorrect in as-
serting that the latter is something which the state does not have a
legitimate interest in eliminating. As the Court in Palmore v. Sidoti
noted, "The Constitution cannot control.., prejudices, but neither
cannot it tolerate them. Private biases may be outside the reach of the
law, but the law cannot, directly or indirectly, give them effect.""
Conclusion
The Court seems to have adopted a schizophrenic attitude with
respect to discriminatory practices. On the one hand, the Court bends
402. Freeman v. Pitts, 112 S. Ct. 1430 (1992).
403. Board of Educ. of Oklahoma City Pub. Sch. v. Dowell, 498 U.S. 237 (1991).
404. The claim here is not that the State should prohibit people from moving where
they want but merely that it seems appropriate for the state to create incentives to prevent
resegregation.
405. See supra text accompanying notes 402-04.
406. 466 U.S. 429, 433 (1984).
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over backwards not to impose penalties for intentional discrimination,
by presuming that intentional discrimination is not present unless the
evidence establishes otherwise. On the other hand, the Court
presumes invidious intentional discrimination when examining benign
discrimination policies. It is the Court's imposition of a standard
which makes it relatively difficult to strike pernicious discrimination
but relatively easy to strike benign discrimination that makes its cur-
rent policy so objectionable.
One way of illustrating the problem is to examine the Court's
position with respect to the importance of the "victims"' views. When
considering the effects of benign discrimination, the Court seems to
worry a great deal about the possible resentment which might be felt
by those who do not receive certain benefits. When the Court consid-
ers cases in which individuals are accused of pernicious discrimination,
however, the Court gives short shrift to the "victims"' views. At the
very least, the Court should use the same exacting standard for benign
and invidious discrimination. 4°7
One difficulty with the Court's view is that it seems so capricious.
"There is an undoubted public interest in 'stability and orderly devel-
opment of the law,'"40 and the Court's invidious discrimination juris-
prudence sacrifices that interest.
There are other difficulties as well. The Court's implicit double
standard will not promote the racial acceptance and harmony which
the Court claims to want. The Court's alternating presumptions con-
cerning intentional discrimination and emphases on "victim's" percep-
tions cannot help but promote the view that the Court does not want
to rectify past injustice or even extirpate inappropriate views about
race, but rather wants to maintain the status quo or, perhaps, the sta-
tus quo of a bygone era. That the Court uses its concept of invidious-
ness to effect these ends, whether consciously or unconsciously,
illustrates how invidious some classifications can be.
407. See Sullivan, supra note 1, at 1623 ("If racially divisive effects help support strict
scrutiny of affirmative action measures, then such effects should do similar work when the
resentment is on the other side. Utilitarian concern about the consequences of racial
measures for social harmony should apply equally no matter whose ox is gored.").
408. Johnson v. Transportation Agency, 480 U.S. 616, 644 (1987) (Stevens, J., concur-
ring) (citing Runyon v. McCrary, 427 U.S. 160, 190 (1976)).
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